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Circuit and the District for Puerto Rico
Commit to Equal Protection Without
Abandoning the Insular Cases Doctrine
Alejandro J. Anselmi González *
For American citizens, one of the most important safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States
is the equal protection of the law. The United States prides
itself on the doctrine and jurisprudence of equal protection
because of the social progression achieved since the end of
the Civil War. The Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution eliminated the institution of slavery and were supposed to guarantee equal civil and legal status to all citizens. The Constitution, however, has not been consistently
interpreted in this way since the end of the SpanishAmerican War in 1898. The nation emerged from this conflict with a renewed colonial prerogative and with newly
acquired territories overseas: Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Philippines. The acquisition of new territory, populated by
peoples of wholly different cultures to those of the AngloSaxon, European-American political elites of Washington,
D.C., necessitated an approach to government that was politically and legally rejected since the founding of the naJ.D. Candidate 2022, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2019
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grateful for the work of the editors of the University of Miami Inter–American
Law Review in preparing this Note for publication. I would like to thank Professor Frances Hill for her guidance during the writing process. Finally, I would
like to especially thank Sydney, for supporting and accompanying me throughout law school and beyond.
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tion: colonialism. In Puerto Rico and later unincorporated
territories—those not intended for eventual statehood—
colonial governance meant political and social subjugation. The Supreme Court legitimized the federal government’s colonial plans in a series of decisions beginning in
the late 19th century, known as the Insular Cases. These
decisions influence the legal status of American citizens residing in the unincorporated territories and allow the federal government to evade the constitutional mandate of
equal protection of the law. This Note discusses the racist
logic of the Insular Cases and the vestiges of colonial appropriation of the unincorporated territories, reflected in
the exclusion of Puerto Ricans from the Supplemental Security Income program. In United States v. Vaello-Madero,
the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico and the
First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the federal government’s exclusion of Puerto Ricans from that program, arguing that equal protection of the law, embodied in the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, does not allow the
federal government to abuse its constitutional power under
the Territory Clause to regulate the unincorporated territories. This Note concludes, however, that Vaello-Madero is
not a vehement rejection of the Insular Cases and their jurisprudential progeny and that it remains unlikely for the
Supreme Court to undo its labor from the late 19th and
early 20th century, when its opinions treating the subject of
the territories were heavily marked by notions of Social
Darwinism and racism. Nonetheless, Vaello-Madero is a
promising hint that the federal judiciary is sensitive to the
inconsistent application of the guarantee of equal protection throughout the U.S. territories overseas and is willing
to resist the Insular Cases doctrine.
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It happened a long time ago an’ I don’t raymimber
clearly how it came up, but some fellow said that
ivrywhere th’ constitution wint, th’ flag was sure to
go. ‘I don’t believe wan wurrud iv it,’ said th’ other
fellow. ‘Ye can’t make me think th’ Constitution is
goin’ thrapezin’ around ivrywhere a young liftnant
in th’ ar–rmy takes it into his head to stick a flag
pole. It’s too old. It’s a homestayin’ Constitution
with a blue coat with brass buttons onto it, an’ it
walks with a goold–headed cane. It’s old an’ it’s
feeble an’ it prefers to set on th’ front stoop an’
amuse th’ childher. It wudden’t last a minyit in thim
thropical climes. ‘T wud get a pain in th’ fourteenth
amindmint an’ die before th’ doctors cud get ar–
round to cut it out . . . ‘ ‘But,’ says th’ other, ‘if it
wants to thravel, why not lave it?’ ‘But it don’t
want to.’ ‘I says it does.’ ‘How’ll we find out?’
‘We’ll ask th’ Supreme Court. They’ll now what’s
good f’r it.’
– Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley’s Opinions
(1901) 1
FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 21–22 (R.H. Russell 1901).
Speaking in a thick Irish brogue, Mr. Dooley commented on the popular question of whether the “Constitution follows the flag” as the United States expanded into new territories beyond the continental shores. This observation was made
in a discussion surrounding the nature of the Insular Cases.

1
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Puerto Rico faces unprecedented challenges. The Island, which
is a United States territory, 2 has experienced a sharp decline in
government revenues. 3 Commencing in 1996, the Federal Government “scaled back” a series of tax credit incentives for American corporations doing business in Puerto Rico. 4 The progressive
cancellation of tax credit incentives culminated in 2006, after
which the Puerto Rican government “increasingly turned to the
debt markets” to obtain funding for government spending. 5 According to the United States Government Accountability Office,
between the fiscal years 2005 and 2014, Puerto Rico’s public debt
grew from $39.2 billion to $67.8 billion, representing 66% of its
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 6 In January 2016, Puerto Rico
defaulted on its public debt. 7 By then, Puerto Rico’s fiscal crater
had grown to $72 billion. 8 That same year, Congress passed the
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act
(PROMESA) to address Puerto Rico’s default and fiscal responsibilities. 9
Tim Webber, What Does Being A U.S. Territory Mean For Puerto Rico?,
NPR (Oct. 13, 2017, 4:39 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/13/557500279/
what-does-being-a-u-s-territory-mean-for-puerto-rico.
3
Javier Balmaceda, Long in Recession, Puerto Rico Needs More Than Just
COVID-19 Relief to Overcome Its Crises, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES
1 (May 7, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/5-7-20econ
.pdf.
4
Diane Lourdes Dick, U.S. Tax Imperialism in Puerto Rico, 65 AM. U.L.
REV. 1, 7 (2015).
5
Id.
6
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-160, U.S. TERRITORIES
PUBLIC DEBT OUTLOOK 12 (2017).
7
Mary Williams Walsh, Struggling Puerto Rico Defaults on Its Debt Payments, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/bus
iness/dealbook/puerto-rico-defaults-on-debt-payments.html.
8
Id.
9
Patricia Guadalupe, Here’s How PROMESA Aims to Tackle Puerto Rico’s Debt, NBC NEWS (June 30, 2016, 1:39 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/news/latino/here-s-how-promesa-aims-tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741 (“It
creates a fiscal control board comprised of seven members. The board would not
be accountable to the island government and would have control over Puerto
Rico’s budget, laws, financial plans, and regulations. The control board has the
power to force the island government to balance its budget and force a restruc2
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As of 2019, the percentage of Puerto Rico residents who live in
poverty is approximately 43%. 10 According to the U.S. Census
Bureau, “poverty in Puerto Rico is still much higher than the U.S.
national rate of 13.1% and is more than double the poverty rate of
19.7% in Mississippi,” the state with the “highest poverty rates in
2018.” 11 Additionally, Puerto Rico’s population is becoming older
due to a combination of declining birth rates and emigration of
young residents. 12
At the same time, Puerto Rico exhibits a higher rate of adults
with some type of disability than the United States. 13 Adult Puerto
Rican residents show higher levels of “select functional disability
types,” showing higher rates of mobility, cognition, independent
living, hearing, vision, and self–care limitations than adults in the
United States. 14 As of late 2020, Puerto Ricans on the Island, who
are U.S. citizens, 15 did not receive the same federally–funded disability benefits as citizens in the States. 16 In fact, the Puerto Rican
government resorted to the municipal bond market to fund its Medicaid budget. 17 In 2016, debt accrued to provide for disabled residents’ healthcare “constitute[d] an estimated one–third of Puerto
Rico’s massive $70 billion of outstanding bonds.” 18 Instead of receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, Puerto Rituring with bondholders . . . and other creditors if an agreement is not
reached.”).
10
QuickFacts: Puerto Rico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/quickfacts/PR (last visited Nov. 7, 2021).
11
Brian Glassman, A Third of Movers from Puerto Rico to the Mainland
United States Relocated to Florida in 2018, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 26,
2019), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/09/puerto-rico-outmigrationincreases-poverty-declines.html.
12
Puerto Rico’s Nutrition Assistance Program Helps Seniors, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1, 2 (2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default
/files/atoms/files/6-11-20fa3.pdf.
13
Disability Impacts Puerto Rico, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/impacts/puertorico.html (last updated Jun. 28, 2021).
14
Id.
15
Jones–Shafroth Act, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917).
16
Robin Respaut, The disabled in Puerto Rico fend for themselves after
decades of U.S. neglect, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.
reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-puertorico-disability/.
17
Id.
18
Id.
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cans received a “meager and nearly forgotten federal program from
the 1960s, called Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled” (AABD). 19
Ordinarily, elderly, blind, and disabled United States citizens “living in any of the 50 states, Washington, D.C., and the Mariana Islands,” who “struggle financially” receive SSI benefits. 20 However, Puerto Rican residents are not eligible to receive SSI benefits. 21
The available assistance for disabled Puerto Rican residents is
inadequate, especially when compared to the benefits that other
disabled citizens receive in the continental United States and the
Mariana Islands. 22 For instance, under AABD, Puerto Rican residents must earn $65 or less per month to be financially eligible for
the program. 23 Meanwhile, individuals eligible for SSI benefits
must earn $750 or less to satisfy financial requirements. 24 Furthermore, Puerto Rican residents who qualify for AABD receive,
on average, $77 per month in assistance while SSI beneficiaries
receive an average of $533. 25
There is a territorial disparity between Puerto Rico, whose residents are not eligible to receive SSI benefits, and the States (and
the Northern Mariana Islands), whose residents are eligible for
SSI. 26 It is difficult to explain this discrepancy in treatment without
understanding Puerto Rico’s complicated territorial status. 27 Puerto
Rico is neither independent, nor a state of the United States; rather,

Id.
Danica Coto, US court upholds SSI for Puerto Ricans in key ruling, ABC
NEWS (Apr. 10, 2020, 7:05 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireSto
ry/us-court-upholds-ssi-puerto-ricans-key-ruling-70095490.
21
Id.
22
See id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
WILLIAM R. MORTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10482, SUPPLEMENTAL
SECURITY INCOME (SSI) 3 (2020).
27
See Samuel Issacharoff et al., What Is Puerto Rico?, 94 IND. L.J. 1, 2
(2019) (“The events of the day, from hurricane relief to debt restructuring,
brought to public attention uncertainty about what it means to be a “Commonwealth,” a legal status unmentioned in the U.S. Constitution, a word that lacks a
direct translation into Spanish, and indeed a concept without a terribly clear
meaning in English.”).
19
20
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it is a commonwealth, the meaning of which is hotly debated. 28
Puerto Rico’s unprecedented status is due to 20th century legislation legitimized by the Supreme Court in the infamous Insular
Cases. 29 The Foraker Act, the Jones–Shafroth Act, Public Law
600, and Public Law 447 crafted a colonial regime 30 whereby the
Puerto Rican government lacks true sovereignty. 31 Furthermore,
the Insular Cases sanctioned the federal government’s colonial
project and recognized Puerto Rico as a foreign territory “in a domestic sense,” legalizing unequal treatment of the laws in the territories. 32 However, the fact remains that Puerto Ricans are United
States citizens. 33
Recognizing this, the District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico and the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was unconstitutional to exclude Puerto Rican residents from SSI benefits because equal protection of the law and due process guarantees of the
Constitution apply equally in the States and in unincorporated territories. 34 As a result, United States v. Vaello-Madero elevates
Puerto Rico’s status, and that of other United States unincorporated
territories, vis–à–vis the states and incorporated territories, and
signals a shift towards limiting the federal government’s capacity
to “abuse the territories” by denying them equal rights. 35 NevertheR. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44721, POLITICAL STATUS OF
PUERTO RICO: BRIEF BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS FOR
CONGRESS 5–6 (2017).
29
Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32
YALE L. REV. 57, 58 (2013) (“These cases authorized the colonial regime created by Congress, which allowed the United States to continue its administration—and exploitation—of the territories acquired from Spain after the Spanish–
American War of 1898”).
30
Cf. id. (referring to the colonial relationship created by legislation after
1898, including the Foraker legislation, Jones–Shafroth legislation, Public Law
600, and Public Law 447).
31
Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism:
The Insular Cases (1901–1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 235 (1996).
32
See id. at 249–50 (explaining Justice White’s incorporation doctrine,
which later became a central component of the Insular Cases doctrine).
33
Jones–Shafroth Act, ch. 145, 39. Stat. 951, 953 (1917).
34
United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 215 (D.P.R. 2019);
United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2020).
35
See Mark Joseph Stern, Judge Blocks Discrimination Against Puerto
Ricans, Says Federal Government Is Engaging in “Citizenship Apartheid,”
28
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less, the federal government has already petitioned for a writ of
certiorari to appeal the First Circuit’s decision in the Supreme
Court. 36 There is much uncertainty, however, surrounding how the
Supreme Court would handle an appeal of Vaello-Madero, especially because a conservative–appointed majority could “rush to
strike down or hollow out long–standing liberal precedents,” 37 like
United States v. Windsor, 38 where Justice Kennedy reiterated a
longstanding principle of equal protection analysis: “The Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’
justify disparate treatment of that group.” 39
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has avoided addressing the jurisprudential quagmire that the Insular Cases present, even when
directly asked to do so, making it unlikely that the Court will explicitly reverse any portion of the Insular Cases doctrine. 40 Further
decreasing the likelihood that the Justices will offer any direct pronouncements against the Insular Cases, Vaello-Madero does not
rely directly on a rejection of the Insular Cases doctrine to strike
down the government’s effort to treat residents of Puerto Rico differently from residents of the States and the Northern Mariana Islands. 41 Consequently, even if the Supreme Court agrees with the
First Circuit, it is unlikely that it will undo the principles from the
Insular Cases. 42
SLATE (Feb. 5, 2019, 5:36 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/
puerto-rico-social-security-benefits-gelpi-ruling-citizenship-apartheid.html.
36
Brief for Petitioner–Appellant at 1, United States v. Vaello-Madero, No.
20–303 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
37
Amelia Thomson–DeVeaux & Laura Bronner, How A Conservative 6–3
Majority Would Reshape The Supreme Court, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 28,
2020, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-a-conservative-6-3majority-would-reshape-the-supreme-court/.
38
Stern, supra note 35.
39
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (citing Dep’t of
Agric. v. Moreno 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)).
40
See Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux & Neil C. Weare, After Aurelius: What
Future of the Insular Cases?, 130 YALE L.J. F. 284, 285 (2020).
41
Id. at 305.
42
See id. at 286 (“The Court declined to extend the Insular Cases and
seemed to question ‘their continued validity,’ but it still dismissed the request to
‘overrule the much–criticized’ decisions ‘and their progeny.’”). See also Lyle
Denniston, Constitution Check: Are the Insular Cases Still Binding, After a Cen-
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Vaello-Madero stands for the proposition that fundamental
constitutional protections apply in the unincorporated territories,
like Puerto Rico, even where there is no explicit congressional
proclamation extending the same to these lands. 43 Vaello-Madero
implicitly represents the judiciary’s stance against the incorporation doctrine derived from Justice White’s concurring opinion in
Downes v. Bidwell, 44 which developed to threaten even the most
fundamental guarantees in the Constitution when applied in unincorporated territories. 45 While Vaello-Madero does not signal the
end of the Insular Cases doctrine, 46 it does represent a more restrictive reading of the powers granted to Congress by the Territorial Clause and a limitation of overtly racist 20th century jurisprudence regarding the governance of the unincorporated territories. 47

tury?, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Jun. 17, 2016), https://constitutioncenter.org
/blog/constitution-check-are-the-insular-cases-still-binding-after-a-century (The
Supreme Court has relied upon legal principles derived from the Insular Cases
despite the impetus of modern civil rights advocacy to “advance the constitutional protection for people in the territories” by urging the Court to abandon
such outdated jurisprudence.).
43
United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 213 (D.P.R. 2019).
44
Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 247–48.
45
See Marybeth Herald, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag Into United
States Territories or Can It Be Separately Purchased and Sold, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 707, 712 (1995).
46
See Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 212 (stating that the opinion will
not address the complicated constitutional questions surrounding Puerto Rico’s
political status).
47
See id. at 210–11; see also United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12,
17–18 (1st Cir. 2020); see also Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 289 (“The discourse of the Insular Cases incorporated many of the notions that constituted
what I have termed the ‘ideology of expansion.’ First of all, it was overtly racist.
In Downes, Justice Brown expressed:
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying and distant possessions grave
questions will arise from differences of race, habits, laws and customs of the
people, and from differences of soil, climate and production, which may require
action on the part of Congress that would be quite unnecessary in the annexation
of contiguous territory inhabited only by people of the same race, or by scattered
bodies of native Indians.
The obvious racism of the Court’s expressions cannot be separated from others
reflecting an adherence by some members of the Court to the tenets of the ideologies of Manifest Destiny and Social Darwinism, which were part of the ideological framework of the dominant circles in the United States at the time.”).
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This Note will analyze the issue of Puerto Rico’s constitutional
status and the role of the Insular Cases through an examination of
the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico’s decision in
United States v. Vaello-Madero and the First Circuit’s affirmation.
To aid comprehension of the legality of the federal government’s
treatment of American citizens in Puerto Rico, Part II will outline
the relationship that exists between the United States and Puerto
Rico, with a particular emphasis on legislation appropriating—not
incorporating—the Island into the U.S. constitutional framework.
Understanding the distinction between appropriation and incorporation is key to accurately perceive the degree to which constitutional protections attach to citizens residing in the territories.
Part III will examine how American jurists approached the
question of governance of the territories at the beginning of the
20th century to provide an ideological background to the Insular
Cases. This analysis will provide the reader with a summary of the
salient issues that preeminent legal minds and decision–makers
faced in the aftermath of the Spanish–American War, compelling
the creation of a framework to organize the relationship between
mainland states and the acquired islands. The conclusions drawn at
this point in history directly influenced foundational Supreme
Court decisions, known as the Insular Cases, cementing the jurisprudential thinking of the early 20th century regarding the rights of
Anglo–Saxon majorities in relation to the new Hispanic, Pacific–
Islander, and Asian subjects. Part III will then analyze the relevance of the Insular Cases, explaining how constitutional guarantees apply to residents of unincorporated territories. Particular attention will be dedicated to the development and influence of the
territorial doctrine and how it has evolved to deprive U.S. subjects
of fundamental constitutional guarantees.
Part IV will present the Vaello-Madero decisions and Part V
will analyze them in light of precedent and legislation establishing
Puerto Rico’s status. This analysis will show how Vaello-Madero
militates against the overexpansion of the Insular Cases doctrine
by reaffirming that fundamental guarantees, like equal protection
of the law and due process, do apply in unincorporated territories.
However, it will also show that Vaello-Madero is not altogether
revolutionary, as it does not advocate for an outright rejection of
the Insular Cases, and merely promotes a return to the majority’s
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pronouncement in Downes v. Bidwell, which postulated that “certain natural rights” found in the Constitution must extend to all
regions under the American flag. 48 Lastly, Part VI will address
future possibilities regarding the validity of the Insular Cases and
the impact of Vaello-Madero on the meaning of citizenship and
equal protection under the laws.
Comprehending how Vaello-Madero contravenes 120–year–
old jurisprudence that created a modern colonial system 49 whereby
territorial citizens, like Puerto Ricans today, were relegated to second–class status 50 will highlight the implicit understanding among
governing circles in Washington that U.S. citizens in the territories
are not American citizens. 51 Vaello-Madero is certainly a step in
the correct direction to secure the rights of all United States citizens, but it is insufficient to supersede a century’s worth of jurisprudential development at the Supreme Court. 52 Modern civil
rights advocacy for the territories is pushing the call to reject the
Insular Cases to the highest court of the land; it is now up to the
Supreme Court to decide.

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282–83 (1901) (discussing the difference between natural rights, like personal liberty, equal protection of the laws
and due process, and those rights peculiar to the jurisprudential system of the
United States, like citizenship, suffrage, others “unnecessary to the proper protection of individuals.”).
49
See generally Rivera Ramos, supra note 31 (discussing how the Insular
Cases created a colonial relationship between the United States and the diverse
territories acquired after the Spanish–American War).
50
Pedro A. Malavet, The Inconvenience of a “Constitution [that] Follows
the Flag . . . but Doesn’t Quite Catch Up with It”: From Downes v. Bidwell to
Boumediene v. Bush, 80 MISS. L.J. 181, 249 (2010).
51
See id. at 249–50 (“[T]he Court’s interpretation [in Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298 (1922),] of the [grant of citizenship to Puerto Ricans] clearly assumes that Puerto Rican U.S. citizens are not the ‘American citizens’ who could
resettle an ‘American’ state.”) (emphasis added). In turn, these implicit understandings of colonial citizens led to a natural conclusion that they were not as
deserving of constitutional guarantees as those on the mainland. See id.
52
Cf. id. at 256–57 (discussing a case similar in nature to Vaello-Madero
but underscoring that “the matter remains in the hands of the Supreme
Court . . . .”).
48
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BACKGROUND

A.

Puerto Rico’s Territorial and Political Status
The United States acquired Puerto Rico from Spain in the aftermath of the Spanish–American War. 53 In the two decades after
the conclusion of the war in 1898, it would have been difficult to
describe Puerto Rico as anything other than a colony of the United
States, which was considered “an international badge of dishonor
for America.” 54 While U.S. presidents focused on “lectur[ing] other countries about the instabilities of imperial control and the need
for self–determination,” 55 Puerto Rico was governed by presidentially–appointed generals between 1898 and 1900. 56 Accordingly,
the “military governor in charge of the Army of Occupation” in
Puerto Rico was the “administrator of civil affairs” and had the
authority to “issue orders with the force of law.” 57 Thus, the United States military “controlled” Puerto Rico’s “municipal laws and
courts.” 58 As one scholar commented:
For two years, between the time that [the Treaty of
Paris] was signed in 1898 and the enactment of the
Foraker Act in 1900, Puerto Rico became a part of
the nation. Yet, while Puerto Rico became an integral part of the U.S., the treaty, unlike prior treaties
of this nature, did not provide for the annexation of
the island or the naturalization of its inhabitants. In
fact, the open–ended nature of this treaty enabled
law and policy makers to invent a new legal status
of space that could be located somewhere in between a territory and a possession. 59

David Rezvani, The Basis of Puerto Rico’s Constitutional Status: Colony,
Compact, or “Federacy”?, 122 POL. SCI. Q. 115, 115 (2007).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Military Government in Puerto Rico, LIBR. OF CONG. (Jun. 22, 2011),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/milgovt.html.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Charles R. Venator Santiago, Constitutional interpretation and nation
building: the Territorial Clause and the Foraker Act, 1787–1900 132 (Sept.
53
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In fact, for the inhabitants of the claimed territories, the most
crucial aspect of the peace treaty between the United States and
Spain was Article IX, by which Spain surrendered its sovereignty
over Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. 60 Under Article IX,
Congress would decide the political status “of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States.” 61
i. The Foraker Act of 1900: Establishing a Civilian
Government in Puerto Rico without Sovereignty or
Constitutional Guarantees
On April 12, 1900, Congress enacted the Foraker Act, officially known as the Organic Act of 1900, which “recogni[zed] Puerto
Rico as a dependent possession of the United States” 62 and established a civilian government on the Island. 63 Nonetheless, the Foraker Act has been described as a means by which Congress
achieved colonialism through legislation. 64 According to Professor
Martin J. Collo, the underlying motivations for the Foraker Act
were not merely to provide a transition to civilian government, but
also to secure an important strategic base in the Atlantic, pursue an
“aggressive inter–American trade policy,” and commit to bringing
the “blessings of civilization” to the Island. 65 Ohio Senator Joseph
P. Foraker, sponsor for the legislation, argued: “[T]he sooner this
country realizes that it is a power among the nations of the world
and wants colonial possessions, the better.” 66 Accordingly, a civilian government in Puerto Rico was not the central focus of the Foraker Act; rather, the goal was to delineate “the role of the United

2002) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst) (on file with
author) (emphasis added).
60
See id. at 136–38.
61
A Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain: December 10,
1898, AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/sp1898.asp
(last visited Oct. 25, 2021).
62
Santiago, supra note 59, at 127.
63
See Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, 81–86 (1900).
64
Martin J. Collo, The Legislative History of Colonialism: Puerto Rico and
the United States Congress, 1898 to 1950, 12 J. OF THIRD WORLD STUD. 265,
268 (1995).
65
Id. at 269.
66
Id. at 268.
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States as a world power.” 67 It should be no surprise that the Foraker Act only provided for a civilian government with limited
power, as Senator Foraker believed it was important to grant Puerto Ricans “some measure of self–rule,” but “only as much as ‘it
was safe to give them.’” 68 Thus, only the lower chamber of the
Island’s legislature, the House of Delegates, was to be elected by
qualified voters. 69
While the Foraker Act established a civil government, it made
no movement toward granting the Island’s residents United States
citizenship. 70 Instead, the law states that they ceased to be Spanish
subjects but were now “deemed and held to be citizens of Porto
Rico, and as such entitled to the protection of the United
States . . . .” 71 Furthermore, the Island’s governor and its executive
council were to be appointed by the President of the United
States. 72 Crucially, the Act subjected Puerto Rico to all laws of the
United States 73 and preserved Congress’s supremacy over the Island’s legislative assembly by providing “[t]hat all laws enacted by
the legislative assembly shall be reported to the Congress of the
United States, which hereby reserves the power and authority, if
deemed advisable, to annul the same.” 74 Additionally, the Foraker
legislation provided that qualified voters in Puerto Rico would
elect a “Resident commissioner to [the] United States.” 75 The Resident Commissioner would “be entitled to official recognition as
such by all Departments, upon presentation to the Department of
State of a certificate of election of the governor of Porto Rico . . . .” 76 but would have no voting power in Congress. 77
Id.
Id. at 270.
69
Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, 83 (1900).
70
See generally id. (making no mention of providing residents of Puerto
Rico, previously Spanish subjects, with United States citizenship).
71
Id. at 79.
72
Id. at 81–82.
73
Id. at 80.
74
Id. at 83.
75
Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, 86 (1900).
76
Id.
77
Lanny Thompson, The Imperial Republic: A Comparison of the Insular
Territories under U.S. Dominion After 1898, 71 PAC. HIST. REV. 535, 559
(2002).
67
68
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The Foraker legislation granted Puerto Rico fewer autonomist
powers than what Spain had given to proponents of self–
determination rights for the Island in 1897. 78 In the months leading
up to the Spanish–American War, Spain attempted to assuage independentist fever in Cuba and Puerto Rico by granting them the
right to self–government with the Autonomy Charters of 1897. 79
Puerto Rico’s Autonomy Charter granted “a robust form of autonomy, with a local legislature and representation in the [Spanish]
Cortes.” 80 In that same year, Spain also granted residents of Cuba
and Puerto Rico the same rights of Spanish citizens and universal
voting rights to all men over twenty–five. 81
Meanwhile, the Foraker Act subjected all decisions by the Island’s legislative assembly to Congressional approval. 82 Additionally, the right to vote was circumscribed by qualifications imposed
“under the laws and military orders in force . . . subject to such
modifications and additional qualifications and such regulations
and restrictions as to registration as may be prescribed by the executive council.” 83 The Island’s sole elected representative in Congress “had no clearly defined rights or duties” and his status was
“practically the same as that of a territorial delegate” or “a nonvoting, second–class member of the House of Representatives.” 84 The
Foraker legislation also deprived Puerto Ricans of control over the
Island’s political economy because they had no power to decide
See Collo, supra note 64, at 271 (“The reaction of the Puerto Rican political elite to the provisions of the Foraker Act ranged from disappointment to
bitter resentment. In view of early U.S. promises of ‘liberal institutions’ and
‘freedoms,’ most Puerto Ricans felt defrauded. Not only did Congress grant the
island considerably fewer powers of self–governance than were acquired under
Spanish rule, but the provisions of the Foraker Act clearly showed that Congress
did not intend to prepare the island for eventual statehood.”).
79
See Marisabel Brás, The Changing of the Guard: Puerto Rico in 1898,
LIBR. OF CONG. (Jun. 22, 2011), https://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/bras.html.
80
Christina Duffy Ponsa, When Statehood Was Autonomy, in
RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN
EMPIRE 1, 24 (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown–Nagin eds., 2015).
81
Autonomy and War, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/collections
/puerto-rico-books-and-pamphlets/articles-and-essays/nineteenth-centurypuerto-rico/autonomy-and-the-war/.
82
Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, 83 (1900).
83
Id.
84
Thompson, supra note 77, at 559.
78
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trade policies or employ tariffs. 85 Consequently, the Foraker Act
reversed the majority of the freedoms found in the Autonomy
Charter of 1897 and implemented a “system of strict, condescending colonial tutelage” that made Puerto Ricans “dependent wards
of the U.S. Congress, without the full guarantees of the U.S. Constitution.” 86
ii. The Jones–Shafroth Act of 1917: Granting United States
Citizenship to Puerto Ricans without Incorporating Puerto Rico
into the Union
Puerto Rico’s second organic law, the Jones–Shafroth Act of
1917, extended a new measure of autonomy and granted United
States citizenship to all Puerto Ricans. 87 The Jones–Shafroth legislation extended multiple guarantees, including: due process, equal
protection, the right to counsel, habeas corpus, warrant requirements, search and seizure protections, freedom of speech, religious
liberty, and prohibitions of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder,
among others. 88 Additionally, the law replaced the executive council with an elected senate as the upper chamber of the legislative
department of the Island. 89 Most importantly, the law provided
“[t]hat all citizens of Porto Rico . . . and all natives of Porto Rico . . . are hereby declared, and shall be deemed and held to be,
citizens of the United States.” 90 The Jones–Shafroth Act was a definitive step toward cementing the permanence of the “existing
relationship” with Puerto Rico, which the Americans believed

Collo, supra note 64, at 272.
Id. at 271; see also José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire: Notes on the Legislative History of the United States Citizenship of Puerto
Ricans, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 396–97 n.12 (1978) (“The status of national, as
distinguished from citizen, became a convenient construct for those who favored
territorial expansion but did not wish to make the people of the new territory
citizens of the United States or otherwise suggest that they might aspire to
equality under the American constitutional system.”).
87
Collo, supra note 64, at 275.
88
See generally Jones–Shafroth Act, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
89
Id. at 959 (“Except as herein otherwise provided, the Senate of Porto Rico
shall exercise all of the purely legislative powers and functions heretofore exercised by the Executive Council . . . .”).
90
Id. at 953.
85
86
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more tractable and “loyal” than the other 1898 acquisitions. 91 At
the same time, the idea that the relationship with Puerto Rico
should be perpetuated was reinforced by the “apparent acceptance
of colonial rule” in Puerto Rico, given that “expressions of unhappiness with American colonial rule” were “sporadic and modest”
and focused on the “limited scope of local self–government,” particularly under the Foraker Act. 92 As such, the granting of citizenship was designed as “a means of acknowledging the special place
of Puerto Rico among the new colonial territories and of expressing the virtually universal expectation of a permanent relationship.” 93
The grant of citizenship meant that the federal government did
not consider independence to be in Puerto Rico’s future, and, according to Judge José A. Cabranes, 94 created “a second–class citizenship for a community of persons that was given no expectation
of equality under the American system,” which in turn “perpetuat[ed] the colonial status of Puerto Rico.” 95 In effect, the Jones–
Shafroth Act:
[W]as intended to satisfy Puerto Rican desires for
“dignity,” while establishing a permanent link between the now strategically important island and the
United States. But Puerto Ricans did not receive the
same type of citizenship enjoyed by U.S. citizens
living on the mainland. Instead, they were awarded
a second–class, passive citizenship. The new U.S.
citizens in Puerto Rico still remained outside the
purview of the protections, rights and liberties of
the U.S. constitution. In fact, the U.S. Congress retained the power to determine which rights would
Cabranes, supra note 86, at 461 (“The demand for American citizenship
on the part of Porto Ricans is genuine and well–nigh universal. It has become a
deep popular sentiment, and my experience in the island convinced me that a
continued refusal to grant it will gravely wound the sensibilities of this loyal
people. It is a practical as well as a sentimental matter. A Porto Rican traveling
abroad is literally a man without a country.”).
92
Id. at 443.
93
Id at 444.
94
Judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals since 1994.
95
Cabranes, supra note 86, at 398.
91
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be enjoyed by these second–class citizens. Moreover, Puerto Ricans were not granted the right to vote
in U.S. presidential elections, nor were they awarded voting representation in the U.S. Congress. 96
For the first time in American history, prospects of statehood
or “the full panoply of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution” did not accompany the granting of citizenship 97 but it did
signal that Puerto Rico belonged to the United States, and, in turn,
“affirmed [the United States’] acceptance of the contemporaneous
European concept of the ownership of peoples.” 98
iii. Public Law 600 and Public Law 447: Creating the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico without Altering the Colonial
Relationship
In the aftermath of the Second World War, “continued colonial
prerogatives” became an “international liability” for the United
States as a result of the global anticolonialism movement. 99 On
July 3, 1950, Congress approved Public Law 600, whereby the
United States “fully recogniz[ed] the principle of government by
consent . . . so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption.” 100 Congress prescribed the mechanism by which Puerto Ricans were to
elect local representatives and draft a constitution of their own. 101
The mechanisms of Public Law 600 culminated on July 3, 1952,
with Public Law 447 which recognized and approved the “constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.” 102 In an address to
the legislative assembly of Puerto Rico in 1955, Vice President
Nixon offered the following about the new form of government:
To me, it seems that Puerto Rico’s Commonwealth
status is something new in constitutional governments. Something new in this sense: that at one and
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Collo, supra note 64, at 276–77.
Cabranes, supra note 86, at 490.
Id. at 487.
Issacharoff et al., supra note 27, at 10.
Public Law 600, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319, 319 (1950).
Id.; see also Issacharoff et al., supra note 27, at 10.
Public Law 447, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327, 327 (1952).
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in the same time, Puerto Rico is free; and in spite of
the fact, Puerto Rico is associated; a free and associated state. Free because you are, and associated
because you want to be. 103
However, Puerto Rico was not on track to obtaining parity with
the states in the Union. 104 Notwithstanding the progressive recognition of Puerto Rico’s right to self–governance, “it was clear that
what was being created was not a state at all, but something that
was without precedent in the history of American jurisprudence.” 105 This is made especially visible by Judge Juan R. Torruella, 106 when he remarked that Justice White in Downes v. Bidwell
“proclaimed that, while ‘not a foreign country,’ Puerto Rico ‘was
foreign to the United States in a domestic sense.’ This conclusion
establishes the untenable . . . concept of a territory that is both foreign and domestic at once.” 107
Furthermore, the purposes of Public Law 600 and Public Law
447 track perfectly with the purposes of the Foraker and Jones–
Shafroth legislation: to perpetuate United States’ sovereignty over
Puerto Rico. 108 Even though Puerto Ricans were allowed to establish the Commonwealth with its own constitution, it did not mean
that Puerto Rico was by any means a sovereign nation. 109 Judge
R.B.S., Creative Statesmanship vs. the Territorial Clause: The Constitutionality of Agreements Limiting Territorial Powers, 60 VA. L. REV. 1041, 1065
(1974).
104
Id. at 1065–66 (“Statements in Congress reflecting an intent to make a
binding commitment to local autonomy can be countered with statements assuring hesitant congressmen hat the bill ‘would not change the status of the island
of Puerto Rico relative to the United States . . . [or] alter the powers of sovereignty acquired by the people of the United States over Puerto Rico under the
Treaty of Paris.’ Such contradictory statements render the legislative history of
Public Law 600 highly ambiguous.”).
105
Rezvani, supra note 53, at 122.
106
Chief Judge of the First Circuit Court of Appeals between 1994 and 2001.
107
Torruella, supra note 29, at 71–72.
108
See id. at 80–81.
109
Id. at 80; see also Rafael Hernández Colón, The Evolution of Democratic
Governance under the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 50 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 587, 597 (2017) (“‘Both the territorial and federal laws and the
courts,’ the [Puerto Rico Supreme] Court stated, ‘whether exercising federal or
local jurisdiction, are creations emanating from the same sovereignty.’ Relying
on Shell, the P.R. Supreme Court concluded that Puerto Rico adopting its own
103
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Torruella notes: “Although the constitutional status of Puerto Rico
after this exercise was hotly debated, constitutionally speaking, no
change was effectuated in its basic colonial relationship with the
United States.” 110 According to Judge Cabranes, “in permitting the
establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Congress expressly disavowed any intention to alter the island’s preexisting
political relationship with the United States.” 111 At the same time,
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court recognizes this reality in Puerto
Rico v. Sanchez Valle, where it stated that Puerto Rico did not
cease to be a territory of the United States after enacting its constitution because all of its authority derives from a Congressional
grant of power, not from independent sovereignty. 112 Given that
Puerto Ricans were granted citizenship and permission to draft
their own constitution by Congressional fiat, it is Congress, not the
United States Constitution, who determines what rights are granted
to the people of Puerto Rico and to what extent they are allowed to
enjoy these. 113
B.
The Territorial Clause: Congress’s Omnipotent Plenary
Powers over the Territories and The Effects on Puerto Ricans
Congress claims to have such plenipotentiary power granted to
it by the Constitution via Article IV, Section 3’s “Territorial
constitution by delegation from Congress did not confer sovereignty to Puerto
Rico, even though it superseded most of the organic law that established the
Puerto Rican territorial government. Despite the presence of its own constitution . . . the power of the Puerto Rican government . . . emanates from the U.S.
government, not from its own sovereignty.”).
110
Torruella, supra note 29, at 80 (“As cogently summarized by one noted
constitutional scholar: ‘Though the formal title has been changed, in constitutional theory Puerto Rico remains a territory. This means that Congress continues to possess plenary but unexercised authority over Puerto Rico.’ In other
words, while Law 600 vested the Puerto Rican people with a measure of direct
governance . . . it left wholly unaltered Congress’s ‘supreme legislative [and
administrative] power’ over Puerto Rico.”).
111
Cabranes, supra note 86, at 491.
112
See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. ___ (2016).
113
See Torruella, supra note 29, at 73 (“Unfortunately for the inhabitants of
the conquered Spanish islands, despite these well–reasoned dissents, the holding
in Downes laid the grounds for recognition of omnipotent plenary powers in
Congress . . . that to this day have allowed the United States to rule over the
islands without their consent or their democratic participation.”).
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Clause.” 114 In combination with the provision of Article IX of the
Treaty of Paris of 1898, Article IV’s Territorial Clause bestows
upon Congress “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . .” 115 However, the precise meaning of
the Territorial Clause and how it applies to United States territories
has been questioned, and some argue that federal territorial powers
can be used for more than “the autocratic creation of nineteenth–
century–type territories,” like “creative statesmanship” required to
create “constitutionally protected spheres of sovereignty” in territories like Puerto Rico. 116 Nonetheless, the federal courts must be
the ones to re–shape the meaning of Congress’s territorial powers
and provide for a more enlightened definition of territorial governance in Puerto Rico. 117
It is the newly invented legal status of Puerto Rico that operates to deprive its residents equal rights vis–à–vis American citizens in the states. 118 As Professor Linda Bosniak maintains, “citizens and noncitizens are not beings found in nature; they are made
and unmade by way of law and politics, and their making and unmaking can have momentous consequences.” 119 Logically, then,
the concept of citizenship is highly plastic, 120 and in the United
Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 235.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 2.
116
Hernández Colón, supra note 109, at 603–04 (“Citing Sanchez Valle, the
court affirmed in United States v. Maldonado-Burgos that Law 600 and Law
447, by design, provide Puerto Rico with the degree of autonomy and independence that inheres to states of the Union. The court also posited that Puerto Rico’s
constitution created a different political status, which is exceptional in nature
insofar as Congress relinquished its control over Puerto Rico’s internal affairs.”).
117
Id. at 604 (discussing how the federal judiciary has recently promoted a
more “democratic” understanding of the Territorial Clause, providing more protections for United States citizens in the territories).
118
See Malavet, supra note 50, at 189 (“For the territorial citizens this is not
a temporary transition on the way to independence, rather it is a permanent status of constitutional inferiority imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court and enforced by the executive and legislative branches now for over one hundred
years.”).
119
Linda Bosniak, Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought, 8 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 9, 11 (2008).
120
Id. at 11.
114
115

2021]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

109

States’ constitutional context, it is subject to interpretation by statute and the Supreme Court. 121 In the case of Puerto Rico, Congress, with the aid of the Supreme Court, has warped the means
and reasons by which citizenship and incorporation are extended. 122 In the aftermath of America’s colonial experiment of the
early 20th century, United States citizenship means very little to the
rights that Puerto Ricans hold in the American constitutional
framework. 123
This is consequential because, in American constitutionalism,
citizenship is the basis upon which individuals assert their claim to
many rights and protections guaranteed by the laws and foundational documents. 124 Congress holds the reins of Puerto Rico’s status, and with it, the rights of more than three million Puerto Ricans. 125 Without a strong claim to American citizenship, there are
little guarantees “in the way of substantive social protection, rights,
and responsibilities, and it entails virtually no democratic voice at
all.” 126 The federal government has recognized the precarious status of Puerto Ricans to argue in favor of its ability to apply consti-

Cf. Lisa María Pérez, Citizenship Denied: The “Insular Cases” and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1029, 1067 (2008) (highlighting the
roles of the Supreme Court and Congress when interpreting the Constitution to
determine the protections afforded to citizens and conferring citizenship to individuals, respectively).
122
See, e.g., id. at 1039 (“[I]t is within the discretion of the treaty–making
powers and Congress to determine the nature of the relationship between a newly acquired territory and the United States. Because Article IX of the Treaty of
Paris provided that ‘[t]he civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants
of the territories hereby ceded . . . shall be determined by the Congress,’ and
Congress had not provided for the incorporation of Puerto Rico into the Union,
Justice White concluded that Puerto Rico was an unincorporated territory. As
such, the island was not a foreign country . . . .But it was ‘foreign to the United
States in a domestic sense,’ insofar as it was not a member of the American
political community. Because Puerto Rico was foreign to the United States under the Constitution, it was a ‘necessary consequence’ that the Uniformity
Clause was ‘not applicable to Congress in legislating for Porto Rico.’”).
123
See Cabranes, supra note 86, at 490.
124
See Bosniak, supra note 119, at 15.
125
QuickFacts: Puerto Rico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/quickfacts/PR (last visited Oct. 31, 2021).
126
Bosniak, supra note 119, at 15.
121
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tutional guarantees in some places, but not in others, particularly in
the unincorporated territories. 127
III.

THE ROAD TO UNITED STATES V. VAELLOMADERO
To comprehend the significance of United States v. VaelloMadero, it is necessary to trace the legal history that has situated
Puerto Rico within the American constitutional framework and has
labeled it a dependency, rather than part of the United States. This
section will provide an overview of historical context regarding
how the United States approached governing the acquired territories and becoming a colonial authority. This section will also provide an account of the most significant jurisprudence dealing with
the rights of the Puerto Rican people and the powers of the Island’s
government in order to explain Vaello-Madero’s nuanced acceptance of the Insular Cases.
Preconceptions in American legal, political, and social thinking
at the beginning of the 20th century directly influenced the treatment of the newly acquired territories and the rights of their inhabitants. 128 The federal government and Puerto Rico continue to
grapple with the consequences of the legal framework created from
this basis of racial bias and preconceived notions of political and
social underdevelopment in the territories. 129 Therefore, to understand the law, it is important to also understand the federal government’s actions at the beginning of the 20th century that led to
the development of the Insular Cases doctrine. 130

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 10–11.
See generally Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., Our New Peoples: Citizens, Subjects, Nationals or Aliens, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 13, 13 (1903), for Coudert’s understanding of the “colonial problem” that the federal government faced after acquiring the territories in 1898, highlighting the thinking of the era in prominent
jurisprudential circles; see also Thompson, supra note 77, at 539.
129
Compare Issacharoff et al., supra note 27, at 5–7, for a concise summary
of how Puerto Rico’s status, a product of the Insular Cases doctrine, affects
multiple facets of life on the island.
130
See generally Torruella, supra note 29, at 65–73 (providing a historical
and legal timeline of how and why the Insular Cases were decided).
127
128
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A.
The Question of Territorial Governance in the Aftermath of
the Spanish–American War
Prior to the Spanish–American War, the United States focused
on steady expansion of the national territory. 131 Before “Manifest
Destiny” emerged in the national lexicon, Americans relentlessly
looked ambitiously to the West of the Mississippi for land and resources. 132 After “Manifest Destiny” became emblematic of U.S.
expansionist ambitions, the United States waged the Mexican
American War, from which the young nation acquired “five hundred thousand square miles” and spread its borders “from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean . . . .” 133 Until the United States acquired the Philippine Islands, Guam, and Puerto Rico, all the territories annexed since the founding of the Republic had become
States of the Union. 134 According to Professor Lanny Thompson,
the United States had until then adhered to a “well established tradition of territorial expansion,” which included significant proficiency in “the subjugation of racial minorities on the continent.” 135
Thompson specifically refers to African Americans and Native
Americans who had been segregated and treated as second class
citizens, despite the existence of Due Process and Equal Protection
assurances of the Fourteenth Amendment. 136
Territories acquired before the 20th century “had been intended
as European American settler colonies . . . .” but these lands had
See id. at 60–62.
Id. at 61. The term, “Manifest Destiny,” was coined by newspaperman
John Louis O’Sullivan and became “the rallying cry for U.S. expansionists in
the nineteenth century.” Id. at 60. According to Judge. Torruella, the term “encapsulated a mantra of Darwinian imperialism, containing elements of geopolitical theory, religious righteousness, and economic entrepreneurship aimed at
justifying territorial aggrandizement and the conquering, subjugation, and absorption of ‘inferior’ people and races ‘for their own good.’” Id. at 60–61.
133
Id. at 60–62.
134
See id. at 62.
135
Thompson, supra note 77, at 536–37 (“By the end of the nineteenth century, African Americans had been socially segregated and effectively excluded
from political participation in many states, in spite of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, American Indians had been decimated, expelled from their
lands, or moved to Indian Territory or reservations; at the time they were considered wards of the U.S. government.”).
136
See id. at 537.
131
132
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ultimately been admitted to the Union as states. 137 Furthermore,
Judge Torruella notes, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Scott v.
Sanford, still valid when the Insular Cases were decided between
1901–1922, “clearly expressed the lack of constitutional authority
for the United States to rule as a colonial power . . . .” 138 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s pronouncements about the Republic’s lack of constitutional authority to act as a colonial authority,
the United States faced an imperial conundrum when it acquired
Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam. 139
In a 1903 Columbia Law Review article, Frederic Coudert, Jr.
underscored that the country now controlled what he described as
territories “inhabited by a settled population differing from us in
race and civilization to such an extent that assimilation seems impossible, and varying among themselves in race, development, and
culture to so great a degree as to make the application of any uniform political system difficult if not impracticable.” 140 In the eyes
of Americans of the time, the new territories were inhabited by
peoples too culturally different and politically underdeveloped to
deserve outright incorporation into the Union. 141 Thus, the traditional model of territorial expansion by the addition of states would
not be appropriate in the present situation. 142
i. The Territorial Acquisition and Governance Model Before
1898
The territories acquired after the Louisiana Purchase and the
Mexican American War, for instance, were not as densely populated to trigger Coudert’s “imperial problem.” 143 According to
Id.
Torruella, supra note 29, at 62.
139
Thompson, supra note 77, at 537.
140
Coudert, Jr., supra note 128, at 13. Coudert became a key player in the
battleground over American imperialism when he launched two of the Insular
Cases, DeLima v. Bidwell and Downes v. Bidwell. His impressions on the subject are key to an understanding of the legal and political thoughts surrounding
the colonial issue at the beginning of the 20th century.
141
See id.
142
Cf. id.
143
See id. (“It is idle to attempt to find any adequate or guiding precedents in
our former territorial acquisitions. The territories transferred from France and
Mexico were not sufficiently populated to bring us face to face with the real
137
138
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Coudert, aside from the fact that the number of people in the territories acquired from France and Mexico was insignificant, these
peoples were “largely of Caucasian race and civilization” so that a
persistent flow of immigration “soon made the new lands thoroughly American” and the question of imperialism became “academic.” 144 More importantly, the concerns over cultural similarity
and political sophistication as requisites to incorporation into the
American system are salient in Coudert’s writing:
[T]he two civilizations were in fact equal or nearly
so, and the treaties, both of Paris (1800) and of
Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), recognized that fact by
according to the new inhabitants the rights of American citizens. Thus, the problem as to the legal status of the inhabitants of Louisiana and the territory
acquired from Mexico was solved or solved itself
ab initio. The underlying theory upon which both
treaties were based was expansion rather than imperialism. 145
Before the acquisition of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, the United States could overpower cultural differences and
what they viewed as political underdevelopment with significant
population movement. 146 This method of social engineering transimperial problem, i.e., the domination over men of one order or kind of civilization by men of a different and higher civilization. The Nomad tribes of America
presented indeed a problem, but only a passing one . . . .Necessity and the ruthless progress of civilization compelled the opening up and exploiting of the
American continent by the overflowing population of Old Europe. The Indian
problem was met by taking the land, whether as the result of a bargain or
through force as the white man needed it, and the relations of the newcomer
with his Nimrod predecessor were gradually reduced to a minor question
through the agencies of fire water, gunpowder, and well–intended but unwise
policy.”).
144
Id. at 14.
145
Id.
146
Paul Frymer, “A Rush and a Push and the Land Is Ours”: Territorial
Expansion, Land Policy, and U.S. State Formation, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 119, 119
(2014). According to Professor Frymer, the United States accomplished territorial expansion in three phases, including: (1) an assertion by the federal government of legal sovereignty over the “nation’s continental borders through a series
of diplomatic treatises and purchases signed with recognized nation states . . . .”;
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formed the character of the population itself, making it more
“American;” alternatively, military force could be used to exterminate or forcefully relocate entire populations that did not correspond within the “American” archetype. 147 As a result, the United
States could calculate demographic patterns in the sparsely populated and culturally similar territories to make annexation, and the
path towards statehood, clearer for the new lands. 148 However, this
model of expansionism was made obsolete in 1898. 149
When the federal government faced integration of a larger,
more heterogeneous group of people, it had to make decisions regarding how it “‘imagined’ the national community” as a product
of the political treatment given to the new lands. 150 This situation
is more reminiscent of the types of encounters the United States
faced with the acquisition of the Spanish colonies in 1898. 151 Professor Paul Frymer underscores the saliency of concerns regarding
the race of the inhabitants in the newly acquired territories. 152 He
points out that “naturalization laws extended to all Europeans, enabling the relatively swift incorporation of the French population in
Louisiana and Germans [sic] settlers in Wisconsin.” 153 Meanwhile,
he highlights how non–Europeans were given a different kind of
treatment; for instance, the Indian Removal Act of 1830 “mandated
nearly one hundred thousand people leave their homes for lands
(2) treaties and “military actions” against Native Americans to “remove hundreds of thousands of people who lived on and held property rights over the
land”; and (3) advancement of “a domestic policy agenda” engineered to promote the population, settlement and incorporation of “the vast geographic space
into what became, by 1912, the first 48 states.” Id.
147
Id. (“During the first half of the nineteenth century, the territory of the
United States nearly tripled in size as the nation expanded across the continent
from thirteen Atlantic–side states south to the Rio Grande and west to the Pacific Ocean.”).
148
See id.
149
See Coudert, Jr., supra note 128, at 13.
150
Frymer, supra note 146, at 120 (“[S]hould these populations be incorporated, should they be removed to areas beyond the incorporated border, or
should the nation stop expanding and leave certain populations on the other side
of the border? All three of these options were chosen at different times, and race
was a critical intervening factor.”).
151
See Coudert, Jr., supra note 128, at 18.
152
See Frymer, supra note 146, at 120.
153
Id.
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across the Mississippi River, with reported casualties in the tens of
thousands” in direct contravention of democratic ideals. 154
Coudert contrasts the situations where the United States acquired sparsely populated land, or where the population was mostly of European ancestry, calling for the three–part process Frymer
describes, with that which the republic faced after the Spanish–
American War. 155 Coudert states that the question about the governance of the acquired Spanish colonies:
[C]annot be solved either by extermination, as in
the case of the Indian, nor by assimilation, as in the
case of the few Frenchmen and Spaniards. Neither
the methods of Miles Standish nor those of Jefferson will suffice us now. We must move on a heretofore untrodden path and seek for precedent upon
which to base intelligent legislation . . . not in our
own history, but in that of other nations who have
preceded us in attempting to govern non–
assimilable peoples. 156
Consequently, inherent in the approach to how to incorporate
the acquired territories after the Spanish–American War, there is a
notion of “otherness” permeating political and national thought at
the beginning of the 20th century. 157 This notion emphasizes “non–
assimilable” cultural differences and presumed political underdevelopment in the acquired territories. 158 “Otherness,” as a concept,
helps explain the justifications given for embracing a colonial approach to the governance of the acquired territories 159 and the reasons for not applying all constitutional guarantees in these lands. 160
Id.
See Coudert, Jr., supra note 128, at 14.
156
Id.
157
Thompson, supra note 77, at 538.
158
See id.
159
See id. at 539–40 (“No doubt the culture of imperialism in the United
States drew upon and extended the continental colonial experience in the elaboration of the fundamental alterity of the subject peoples in general. [I]t would
seem that the cultural representations of the period . . . demonstrated an acute
awareness of the exceptional diversity of the peoples newly under U.S. dominion. Thus, alterity was not only a homogeneous notion, as most of the literature
has suggested, but was simultaneously a thoroughly differentiated and hierar154
155
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ii. The Colonial Acquisition and Governance Model Emerges
after 1898
In the case of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the territories
“belonged to, but were not a part of, the body politic of the republic” because of the preconceived notion that the islands were “inhabited by peoples of fundamentally different ‘races’ and ‘civilizations who were not capable of self–government.’” 161 Professor
Lanny Thompson highlights that the organic laws of these territories—the Foraker Act, the Jones–Shafroth Act, and Public Law
600 in Puerto Rico’s case—were watershed moments in the trends
underlying American expansionism. 162 These laws essentially created the new system of American imperial colonialism and were a
byproduct of racial biases and misconceptions about the levels of
social and political development in the territories. 163 Prior to the
acquisition of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, the federal
government pursued expansion through European–American settlement and establishing cultural and political hegemony; this process frequently led to statehood for the acquired lands. 164
However, the new territories received a new kind of treatment,
reminiscent of that under the Indian Removal Act of 1830, because

chical one. [T]he proposition of the homogeneous other fails to explicate the
connections between particular representations of subject peoples and the specific patterns of imperial rule. This is due to the impossibility of addressing differences in imperial rule based upon a theory of the homogeneous construction of
the colonial other.”).
160
See id. at 549–51.
161
Id. at 573.
162
Id. (“[F]rom colonialism via settlement to imperialism via political dominion.”).
163
Thompson, supra note 77, at 574 (“The creation of different governments
for Hawai’i, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam followed the general principle that operated throughout the imperial archipelago: The multiple imperial
subjects were to be ruled differently, according to their level of civilization and
capacity for self–government.”).
164
Id. at 573 (“Of the insular territories, only Hawai’i approximated the
continental experience of European American settlement and local hegemony.
For this reason, Hawai’i was the only new territory to be incorporated into the
United States and eventually (1959) to be admitted as a state. Hawai’i, then, was
a distant frontier of European American settlement, and this distinguished it
from the former Spanish colonies acquired in 1898.”).
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of “essential difference[s]” from previous continental territories. 165
Among these differences, Thompson notes, were their geographical separation from the continental United States, tropical character, dense population, and “alien races,” the combination of which
created an “inhospitable” environment for potential American immigrants. 166 Thus, Puerto Rico and the Philippines were treated
more like British colonies than incorporated territories, like Hawai’i. 167 Thompson explains the political dominion of the territories acquired in 1898:
The basic structure of these imperial governments
resembled that of a territorial government, but one
firmly under the control of appointed European
American administrators. The executive branch included a presidentially appointed governor and an
appointed executive commission. The legislative
branch was composed of the same executive commission, which functioned as the upper house, and a
lower house of elected representatives. However,
while Congress integrated Puerto Rico into the
commercial and judicial systems of the United
States, it excluded the Philippines as a foreign port,
with its own currency, and did not make it subject
to U.S. statutes or courts. This followed from the
conclusion that Puerto Rico might somehow become
“Americanized,” but that the Philippines could never be assimilated. 168
Furthermore, under General George Davis’s recommendations
regarding the establishment of a civil government in Puerto Rico,
the Island would first resemble a British crown colony, but should
Id. at 554.
Id. at 555.
167
See id. at 555, 557 (“Gen George Davis, then military governor of Puerto
Rico, also drew upon British colonial models . . . .He quickly rejected the model
of the independent nation, giving a decidedly unfavorable review of the Dominican Republic. He suggested that the colonial model most appropriate for Puerto
Rico was Trinidad, a crown colony with only a partially elected legislative assembly.”).
168
Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
165
166
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eventually develop “responsible representative institutions, combined with elements of the U.S. territorial government.” 169 According to Thompson, General Davis’s recommendations for Puerto
Rico’s civil government would create a “‘dependency’ and decidedly not a territory destined for ‘final incorporation within the
American Union,’ or, statehood.” 170
“Otherness,” nonetheless, is not the sole explanation to the decision to treat the new territories as colonies and the concept cannot independently explain “the particular manifestations of imperial rule in different sites.” 171 However, “otherness” is a prime example of the type of racial bias contributing to preconceived understanding of the new peoples in the territories. 172 Thompson reminds us that “cultural representations—frequently expressed in
gendered, infantilized, and racialized vocabularies—played a fundamental role in the conception, establishment, and justification of
different forms of rule” in the new territories. 173 These understandings, in turn, led to the decision to create a sort of inferior citizenship for Puerto Ricans, without fully equal rights, and which continues to impact the relationship between the United States and
Puerto Rico. 174
There is no better example of the inferior status of Puerto Ricans within the United States’ legal framework than the federal
government’s contention that the Constitution allows Congress to
treat the territories differently from the states. 175 Congress derived
the authority to relegate territorial citizens to a secondary class because of the development of the “longest standing constitutional
Thompson, supra note 77, at 557–58.
Id. at 558.
171
Id. at 538 (“[T]his ‘doctrine of incorporation’ was based upon symbolic
construction of ‘alien peoples’ different from and inferior to European Americans. However, [this] legal analysis does not explain why Congress ‘incorporated’ Hawai’i—by means of a conventional territorial government—or why
different governments were created for each of the unincorporated territories—
Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam.”).
172
Cf. Coudert, Jr., supra note 128, at 13 (demonstrating how the differences
between civilized nations like the United States and uncivilized and exotic locales like the acquired territories created confusion regarding the best approach
to govern the new lands).
173
Thompson, supra note 77, at 574.
174
Cabranes, supra note 86, at 403.
175
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 11.
169
170
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aberration in the history of the Supreme Court”: The Insular Cases
doctrine. 176
B.
The Insular Cases Doctrine: Does the Constitution
“Follow the Flag?”
The Insular Cases constitutionalized “the existence of a second
class of citizens not entitled to all the protections afforded other
citizens on the mainland.” 177 Congress was able to pass the Foraker and Jones–Shafroth legislation, as well as Public Law 600
and Public Law 447, treating Puerto Rico as an unincorporated
territory under the powers conferred to it by the Insular Cases. 178
Even under the now discredited Scott v. Sandford decision of 1857,
the Supreme Court was adamant that, while the United States had
constitutional power to “expand the territory of the United States”
by “the acquisition of territory,” it must be acquired with the intention of admitting the territory into the Union “and not to be held as
a colony and governed by Congress with absolute authority.” 179
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion continued:
Taking this rule to guide us, it may be safely assumed that citizens of the United States who migrate to a Territory belonging to the people of the
United States, cannot be ruled as mere colonists dependent upon the will of the General Government,
and to be governed by any laws it may think proper
to impose. The principle upon which our Government rests, and upon which alone they continue to
exist, is the union of States, sovereign and indeGabriel A. Terrasa, The United States, Puerto Rico, and the Territorial
Incorporation Doctrine: Reaching a Century of Constitutional Authoritarianism,
31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 55, 56–57 (1997).
177
Id. at 85 (“Puerto Ricans . . . are denied the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury, the right to vote for President and Vice–President of the United
States, and the right to equal treatment with respect to welfare benefits. The
welfare cases . . . underscore the amount of deference given to Congress by the
Supreme Court when legislating for the territories.”).
178
See Cabranes, supra note 86, at 436 (“In resolving these controversies [of
the Insular Cases] the Court upheld the power of Congress to treat the islands
acquired from Spain differently from the ‘incorporated territories.’”).
179
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 447 (1857).
176
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pendent within their own limits in their internal and
domestic concerns, and bound together as one people by a General Government, possessing certain
enumerated and restricted powers . . . .A power,
therefore, in the General Government to obtain and
hold colonies and dependent territories, over which
they might legislate without restriction, would be
inconsistent with its own existence in its present
form. 180
Thus, under Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Scott, the federal
government may not perpetually bind itself to a territory by establishing a colonial government. 181 The powers of the Territorial
Clause, as a result, were meant to be used as transitional tools in
the acquired territories to provide “some Government . . . in order
to organize society, and to protect the inhabitants in their persons
and property” until sufficient organization had occurred, and population accumulated, so that the territory could “assume the position
to which it was destined among the States of the Union.” 182 It is
evident, then, that the Puerto Rican experience in the American
constitutional framework is the product of a profound distortion of
these governing principles of territorial governance. 183
Notwithstanding such pronouncements in Scott, which is now
discredited and described as “evil in constitutional law” because of
its distortion of constitutional principles to serve pro–slavery advocates, 184 the Insular Cases granted Congress “omnipotent plenary
powers” to govern the acquired territories as colonies. 185 Standing
in full contrast to Chief Justice Taney’s language in Scott, Justice
Brown in Downes v. Bidwell 186 asserts:
Id. at 447–48.
See id.
182
Id. at 448.
183
See Torruella, supra note 29, at 73.
184
Paul Finkelman, Scott v. Sandford: The Court’s Most Dreadful Case and
How It Changed History, 82 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 3, 3 (2007). Scott v. Sandford
was overruled by the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dredd Scott
Decision Still Resonates Today, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/dred-scott-decision-still-resonates-today-2/.
185
Torruella, supra note 29, at 73.
186
See generally Downes, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (authorizing Congress to
pass, under the Foraker Act, tax provisions that “would have been clearly un180
181
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That the power over the territories is vested in Congress without limitation, and that this power has
been considered the foundation upon which the territorial governments rest, was also asserted by Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland . . . .So,
too, in Mormon Church v. United States. 187
Justice Brown invokes Justice Bradley’s assertion in Mormon
Church:
The power of Congress over the territories of the
United States is general and plenary, arising from
and incidental to the right to acquire the territory itself, and from the power given by the Constitution
to make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory . . . .It would be absurd to hold that the
United States has power to acquire territory, and no
power to govern it when acquired. The territory of
Louisiana . . . and the territories west of the Rocky
Mountains . . . became the absolute property and
domain of the United States . . . .Having rightfully
acquired said territories, the United States government was the only one which could impose laws
upon them, and its sovereignty over them was complete . . . . 188
The Downes plurality concluded that Congress was constitutionally enabled to determine not only when, but also how far constitutional protections attach to the inhabitants of the territories. 189
As a result, Congress was free to “create non–uniform revenue
laws for unincorporated territories, such as Puerto Rico.” 190 The
Downes plurality thus resolved the question of whether the Consticonstitutional for a U.S. state” because of the Uniformity Clause of Article I of
the Constitution, requiring the uniform collection of federal taxes in the states);
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“[A]ll Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States . . . .”).
187
Downes, 182 U.S. at 268 (citations omitted).
188
Id. (quoting Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ v. United States, 136
U.S. 1 (1889)) (emphasis added).
189
Id. at 278–79.
190
Dick, supra note 4, at 33–34.
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tution “follows the flag”: it does not do so automatically. More
specifically, as Professor Marybeth Herald argues, whether the
Constitution follows wherever the U.S. flag is raised depends on
“whether the territory is destined for statehood and whether the
constitutional right in question is fundamental.” 191
Downes also stands for the proposition that there are certain
natural rights in the Constitution that apply in the territories even
without explicit extension by Congress. 192 Justice White explains
in his concurrence:
Whilst, therefore, there is no express or implied limitation on Congress in exercising its power to create
local governments for any and all of the territories,
by which that body is restrained from the widest latitude of discretion, it does not follow that there may
not be inherent, although unexpressed, principles
which are the basis of all free government which
cannot be with impunity transcended. 193
Therefore, the Insular Cases doctrine appears to contain certain
protections for the territories’ inhabitants against despotism. 194
Nonetheless these “unexpressed” constitutional guarantees are
highly malleable and the federal judiciary benefits from the unfixed nature of these protections as they apply to the territories to
reach “creative” decisions when an act of Congress is challenged. 195 Accordingly, “[w]hat particular provisions [of the Constitution] apply depends on ‘the situation of the territory and its
relation to the United States.’” 196
According to Justice White, the United States has the inherent
right as a sovereign nation to determine which constitutional guarantees apply in the territories. 197 It is unsurprising that the ConstiHerald, supra note 45, at 709.
Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 246.
193
Downes, 182 U.S. at 290–91 (White, J., concurring).
194
See id.
195
See, e.g., Herald, supra note 45, at 709.
196
Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 248.
197
See Downes, 182 U.S. at 302 (citing American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S.
511, 542 (1828) (“If [conquered territory] be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition
is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is
191
192
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tution did not follow the flag to Puerto Rico when it came under
possession of the United States or when a civilian government was
established. 198 The integration of Puerto Rico into the constitutional framework of the United States did not envisage its eventual
admission into the Union as a state. 199 Rather, Puerto Rico has always been treated as a perpetual colony, and any grants of autonomy handed to the Island’s government have been undergirded by
the understanding that all insular authority emanates from Congress. 200 As a result, Puerto Rico remains an unincorporated territory of the United States. 201 It is this unincorporated status that
operates to prevent the full application of the Constitution in Puerto Rico. 202
i. The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation
An important corollary to the discussion of Congress’s omnipotent plenary powers over the territories and the application of
fundamental constitutional rights in these lands is whether Congress has enacted legislation that incorporates such territories into
the Union. 203 This concept, known as the doctrine of “territorial
incorporation,” was established by the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases and “distinguishes between incorporated territories,
which are intended for statehood from the time of acquisition and
in which the entire Constitution applies ex proprio vigore, and unincorporated territories, which are not intended for statehood and
in which only fundamental constitutional rights apply by their own
force.” 204 While the Downes judgment provided a floor of constituannexed, either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on such as its
new master shall impose.”)).
198
See Cabranes, supra note 86, at 427.
199
See id.
200
See Torruella, supra note 29, at 82 (“What we have in this relationship is
not the subordination of Puerto Rico’s political power to that of the United
States, but rather the lack of any political power by Puerto Rico vis–à–vis the
United States.”).
201
See id.; see also Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 235.
202
Cf. Sam Erman, Citizens of Empire: Puerto Rico, Status, and Constitutional Change, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1238 (2014) (summarizing the importance of Justice White’s incorporation doctrine in Downes and its effects on
the application of constitutional guarantees in unincorporated territories).
203
See Herald, supra note 45, at 709.
204
Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 688 (9th Cir. 1984).

124

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1

tional guarantees, even though it did not say explicitly which ones,
Justice White’s concurrence offered a more expansive view of
Congress’s freedom to act in the territories. 205 Furthermore, according to a unanimous Supreme Court in Balzac v. Porto Rico,
neither the Foraker nor Jones–Shafroth legislation incorporated
Puerto Rico into the Union. 206 According to then Chief Justice
Taft:
[I]t is just as clearly settled that [the Sixth and Seventh Amendments] do not apply to territory belonging to the United States which has not been incorporated into the Union. It was further settled in
Downes v. Bidwell and confirmed by Dorr v. United
States that neither the Philippines nor Porto Rico
was territory which had been incorporated in the
Union or become a part of the United States, as distinguished from merely belonging to it; and that the
acts giving temporary governments to the Philippines and to Porto Rico had no such effect. 207
Additionally, the creation of the Commonwealth and the Constitution of Puerto Rico with Public Law 600 has not altered the
unincorporated status of the Island. 208 As a result, only those constitutional protections which are deemed “fundamental” 209 and
those which are explicitly extended by a grant of Congress are applicable to the territories. 210
See Herald, supra note 45, at 715 (quoting Downes, 182 U.S. at 282–83
(White, J., concurring)).
206
See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922).
207
Id. at 304–05 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
208
See R.B.S., supra note 103, at 1068 (“The reality, if not the legal definition, of Puerto Rico’s status has been something between colony and independence, similar to statehood, but not the same. Certainly, it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court would reverse an act of Congress granting self–government to
American citizens. However, it is equally unlikely that the Court would block a
later attempt by Congress to reassert its territorial powers. The lapse of time and
the anticolonial spirit of the day are perhaps the best advocates for the irrevocability of the compact.”).
209
Another hotly debated issue in the Supreme Court and beyond the scope
of this note.
210
See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 192 P.R. Dec. 594, 645 (2015).
205
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ii. A Bill of Rights for Puerto Rico: The Supreme Court
Defends Fundamental Constitutional Guarantees for
Unincorporated Territories
Justice Brown’s plurality opinion in Downes had already distinguished between “certain natural rights,” of a fundamental character, “and what may be termed artificial or remedial rights,” specific to the American common law system. 211 Furthermore, among
the class of rights which Downes considered “natural” or fundamental were: “[T]he right to personal liberty and individual property; to freedom of speech and of the press; to free access to courts of
justice, to due process of law and to an equal protection of the
laws . . . and to such other immunities as are indispensable to a free
government.” 212 Justice Brown continued:
Whatever may be finally decided by the American
people as to the status of these islands and their inhabitants . . . it does not follow that, in the meantime, awaiting that decision, the people are in the
matter of personal rights unprotected by the provisions of our Constitution, and subject to the merely
arbitrary control of Congress. Even if regarded as
aliens, they are entitled under the principles of the
Constitution to be protected in life, liberty, and
property. 213
The Jones–Shafroth legislation of 1917 included a bill of rights
providing that “[N]o law shall be enacted in Porto Rico which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the
laws.” 214 According to Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Examining
Board of Engineers v. Flores De Otero, the 1917 bill of rights
“provided Puerto Ricans with nearly all the personal guarantees
found in the United States Constitution.” 215 Furthermore, Justice
Blackmun notes that the wording of the bill of rights in the Jones–
211
212
213
214
215

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 283.
Jones–Shafroth Act, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951, 951 (1917).
Examining Bd. of Eng’rs v. Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 591 (1976).
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Shafroth Act was “almost identical with the language of the Fourteenth Amendment; and when Congress selected them, it must
have done so with the Fourteenth Amendment in mind . . . .” 216
Despite the repeal of the 1917 bill of rights by Public Law 600,
under Downes and Flores De Otero, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to the residents of
Puerto Rico. 217 As a result, notwithstanding the fact that Puerto
Rico is an unincorporated territory of the United States and unlikely to achieve statehood, the plenary and omnipotent territorial
powers extended to Congress under the Insular Cases do not allow
the federal government to deprive Puerto Rican residents of the
equal protection of the laws. 218
iii. Wabol v. Villacrusis: How the Insular Cases Doctrine
Threatens the Most Fundamental Constitutional Guarantees in
the Territories
Professor Herald’s assertion that constitutional protections may
apply in the territories if the rights in question are fundamental
requires further scrutiny. Even though the Insular Cases recognized equal protection of the laws as a fundamental right and applicable in unincorporated territories, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has found that equal protection guarantees do not automatically apply. 219 In a bizarre decision, the Ninth Circuit placed
the “pledge to preserve and protect” the culture and property of the
Id. at 591–92.
Id. at 600.
218
See id. at 600–01 (“The Court recognized the applicability of these guarantees as long ago as its decisions in Downes v. Bidwell, and Balzac v. Porto
Rico. The principle was reaffirmed and strengthened in Reid v. Covert and then
again in Calero-Toledo, where we held that the inhabitants of Puerto Rico are
protected, under either the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth . . . .”).
219
Herald, supra note 45, at 712 (“The Ninth Circuit held that equal protection guarantees do not fully bind the United States government in the [Northern
Mariana Islands], or, more specifically, that the Congress could mandate a race–
based land alienation restriction in the NMI without even the minimal constraints of rational relationship review.”); see also Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958
F.2d 1450, 1459 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is well established that the entire Constitution applies to a United States territory ex proprio vigore—of its own force—
only if that territory is ‘incorporated.’ Elsewhere, absent congressional extension, only ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights apply in the territory.”).
216
217
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Northern Mariana Islands above the guarantees of equal protection
of the laws. 220 Instead of holding that equal protection applies to
the territories as a fundamental constitutional right, defeasible only
by fulfilling the requisites of strict scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit basically eliminated these guarantees for the territories. 221
Judge Poole, for the Ninth Circuit, distinguished between the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the states and its application to unincorporated territories, like the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands. 222 According to Judge Poole:
What is fundamental for purposes of Fourteenth
Amendment incorporation is that which “is necessary to an Anglo–American regime of ordered liberty. In contrast, “fundamental” within the territory
clause are “‘those . . . limitations in favor of personal rights’ which are ‘the basis of all free government.’” In the territorial context, the definition of a
basic and integral freedom must narrow to incorporate the shared beliefs of diverse cultures. Thus, the
asserted constitutional guarantee against discrimination . . . applies only if this guarantee is fundamental in the international sense. 223
The Ninth Circuit refused to apply equal protection guarantees
in the Northern Mariana Islands, and instead relied on an “impractical and anomalous” standard crafted in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Reid v. Covert, using Balzac, part of the Insular Cases, as
an authority for the standard. 224 Under Justice Harlan’s standard, a
court is supplied the tools “for finding a delicate balance between
Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462 (“The Bill of Rights was not intended to interfere with the performance of our international obligations. Nor was it intended
to operate as a genocide pact for diverse native cultures.”).
221
See Herald, supra note 45, at 712 (“The Wabol court’s endorsement of a
broad exemption for the United Congress from equal protection constraints
when dealing with territories opens the door to future exemptions from other
constitutional constraints on government action in the territories.”).
222
Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460.
223
Id. (emphasis added).
224
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
also Herald, supra note 45, at 717.
220
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local diversity and constitutional command . . . .” 225 and can refuse
to extend even a fundamental constitutional protection if it is found
to be impractical and anomalous in the territory. 226 According to
Professor Herald, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is astonishing “because the principle of equal protection embodies far more than
procedural rights, and is one of the most basic and fundamental
principles” of the Constitution. 227
Nonetheless, it is clear from the example of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the principles put forth by the Insular Cases, that
Congress is the gatekeeper of Constitutional rights for the territories. 228 Justice Harlan expressed this sentiment clearly in his explanation for the necessity of the “impractical and anomalous”
standard:
[T]he Insular Cases do stand for an important proposition, one which seems to me a wise and necessary gloss on our Constitution. The proposition
is . . . not that the Constitution “does not apply”
overseas, but that there are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place. In other words, it
seems to me that the basic teaching of . . . the Insular Cases is that there is no rigid and abstract rule
that Congress . . . must exercise [power] subject to
all the guarantees of the Constitution, no matter
what the conditions and considerations are that
Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1461.
Id. at 1462 (“We think it is clear that interposing this constitutional provision would be both impractical and anomalous in this setting. Absent the alienation restriction, the political union would not be possible. Thus, application of
the constitutional right could ultimately frustrate the mutual interests that led to
the Covenant. It would also hamper the United States’ ability to form political
alliances and acquire necessary military outposts. For the NMI people, the
equalization of access would be a hollow victory if it led to the loss of their land,
their cultural and social identity, and the benefits of United States sovereignty.”); see also Terrasa, supra note 176, at 89 (“The Ninth Circuit appeared to
suggest, as the Supreme Court had in the Insular Cases, that necessity, expediency, and convenience determined which rights were ‘fundamental’ for the purpose of territorial incorporation.”).
227
Herald, supra note 45, at 712.
228
See id. at 714.
225
226
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would make adherence to a specific guarantee altogether impracticable and anomalous. 229
It is precisely the lack of any rigid or abstract rule in the Insular Cases doctrine regarding the application of the Constitution in
the territories that has led to the overexpansion of the doctrine. 230
One commentator has explained the workings of the “impractical
and anomalous” standard and its dangers:
If a constitutional claim arises in a land over which
the United States exercises absolute control . . . and
if the court deems that the claim involves a “fundamental meaning” of the Constitution, then the court
should apply the same standard abroad as would
apply if the claim had arisen domestically. But the
court should apply an intermediate standard if only
one of these conditions is met; under this intermediate standard, the court should apply the Constitution
abroad just as it would apply domestically unless
doing so would be “impractical and anomalous.”
A significant weakness in this framework, however,
is the ambiguity of the “impracticable and anomalous” standard. Indeed, the syntactic structure of
the . . . standard is still unclear, as the Court has not
clarified whether it is a disjunctive or conjunctive
standard, and there is also confusion about the
standard’s semantic content, since the Court has
provided little insight into what these words mean
Reid, 354 U.S. at 74–75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Jesse Merriam, A Clarification of the Constitution’s Application
Abroad: Making the Impracticable and Anomalous Standard More Practicable
and Less Anomalous, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 171, 187 (2012), for a discussion of how the “impracticable and anomalous” standard emerged from the
Insular Cases even though the cases do not explicitly employ this language. See
also Erman, supra note 202, at 1234 (“Coudert described the Insular Cases as
presenting the Supreme Court a choice between its ‘reverence for the Constitution’ and allowing ‘the United States properly to govern a people so alien.’
These two conflicting desires . . . ‘were reconciled by [an] ingenious and original doctrine.’ The key strength of the doctrine: its ‘very vagueness . . . was valuable.’”).
229
230
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in this context. With so many ambiguities, the doctrine itself is impracticable because judges cannot
apply it objectively and predictably, and it is also
anomalous in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, because although many judicial doctrines
contain some ambiguity, it is difficult to think of
one of whose semantic content and syntactic structure are this amorphous. 231
Taken to their logical extreme by capitalizing on their amorphous nature, the Insular Cases doctrine and its progeny, like the
“impractical and anomalous” standard, can potentially classify any
constitutional guarantee as non–fundamental, and thus excused
from Congressional consideration when exercising its powers over
unincorporated territories. 232 The answer to the question of whether the Constitution follows the flag thus changes from “it depends”
to “only when Congress wants it to.” 233
As Professor Herald notes, the principle established by the Insular Cases and the Ninth Circuit is “boundless and dangerous because the test defers to the negotiating parties to decide whether
equal protection guarantees or perhaps any other constitutional
restraint should protect individual rights and bridle governmental
Merriam, supra note 230, at 173–74.
Herald, supra note 45, at 712.
233
C.f. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (“The Constitution of
the United States is in force in Porto Rico as it is wherever and whenever the
sovereign power of that government is exerted. The Constitution, however, contains grants of power and limitations which in the nature of things are not always
and everywhere applicable, and the real issue in the Insular Cases was not
whether the Constitution extended to the Philippines or Porto Rico when we
went there, but which of its provisions were applicable by way of limitation
upon the exercise of executive and legislative power in dealing with new conditions and requirements.”) (emphasis added); Denniston, supra note 42 (explaining how federal courts of appeal have relied upon the Insular Cases for the
proposition that the Constitution applies selectively to the territories, and it is
Congress who decides what rights territorial citizens receive); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 10 (“Long ago, [the Supreme Court] held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment concerns ‘persons and classes
of persons’ rather than places, and that the government thus remains free to establish ‘one system for one portion of its territory and another system for another portion.’”) (citations omitted).
231
232
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action in a territory.” 234 Consequently, as is evident in Wabol, the
Insular Cases recognized Congress’s ability to treat the territories
as analogous to “British crown colon[ies]” rather than “a republican State of America.” 235
iv. The Legacy of the Insular Cases: How 19th Century
Racism Deprives Present Day Americans of Their
Constitutional Rights
The Insular Cases showcase the “racial bias that permeated
U.S. society at the turn of the century,” and which directly contributed to the reasoning behind the Cases and the contravention of the
Constitution. 236 According to Rivera Ramos, the Insular Cases
support “a certain vision of democracy” in which political participation is regarded as a privilege and not a right. 237 The prominent
19th century political scientist and constitutional theorist John W.
Burgess stated: “The Teutonic nations 238 can never regard the exercise of political power as a right of man; such a right must be
based on political capacity of which the Teutonic nations are the
only qualified judges.” 239 According to Rivera Ramos:
One thing is to acquire territory, to incorporate that
territory into the nation is quite another . . . .To incorporate implies a decision to share with the alien
Herald, supra note 45, at 713.
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901).
236
Torruella, supra note 29, at 58–59; see also Downes, 182 U.S. at 279–80
(“There seems to be no middle ground between this position and the doctrine
that if [the territories’] inhabitants do not become, immediately upon annexation,
citizens of the United States, their children thereafter born, whether savages or
civilized, are such, and entitled to all the rights . . . of citizens. If such be their
status, the consequences will be extremely serious. [I]t is doubtful if Congress
would ever assent to the annexation of territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however foreign they may be to our habits, traditions and modes of
life, shall become at once citizens . . . .”).
237
Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 293.
238
Burgess employed the labels of “Teutonic nations” or the “North” to refer
to nations composed of mostly White men, as opposed to non–Anglo–Saxon
races, which he considered “unpolitical and barbaric.” See id.
239
Id. (quoted in RUBIN F. WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE
INFLUENCE OF RACIAL ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1893–
1946 16 (1972)).
234
235

132

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1

people “the rights which peculiarly belong to the
citizens of the United States.” Incorporation, then,
means bringing the “other” into the political community that was designed for the “we.” Again, democracy is viewed not as a matter of right, but of
being worthy of belonging to the political community. This was the rationale that had excluded African Americans, Native Americans, Asians, Mexican
Americans, women and the poor from the political
process throughout American history. 240
According to Burgess, the colonies were not under the scope of
such privilege. 241 The Insular Cases reflect this sentiment firstly
by supplying Congress with omnipotent plenary powers. 242 Secondly, they define the relationship between the territories and the
United States in such a way that reassures the inhabitants of the
territories that they possess some measure of equality vis–à–vis the
states of the Union, when in actuality they do not. 243 However, as
is plain from Justice White’s incorporation doctrine and Judge
Poole’s use of the “impractical and anomalous” standard in Wabol,
the federal judiciary has allowed Congress to remain the ultimate
arbiter of constitutional guarantees in unincorporated territories. 244
Considering the racist attitudes backing the legislation pertaining to the governance of Puerto Rico since 1900, even “fundamental” constitutional rights are precariously situated when the federal
government claims its power to act under the Insular Cases doctrine. 245 Even though the Downes judgment offers some semblance
of constitutional guarantee, 246 the incorporation doctrine and the
“impractical and anomalous” standard have been used to circumvent even one of the most fundamental constitutional protections in
the territories: equal protection of the laws. 247

240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247

Id. at 294.
Id. at 293.
Torruella, supra note 29, at 73.
See Cabranes, supra note 86, at 397–98.
Herald, supra note 45, at 712, 719.
See id. at 712.
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 283 (1901).
See Herald, supra note 45, at 712.
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The Insular Cases were a clear abandonment of the Supreme
Court’s abhorrence of colonial governance, and they justified the
dominion over the new territories by highlighting their geographical distance, non–American communities, and differing races,
languages, cultures, religious and legal systems. 248 Even after the
grant of citizenship to all Puerto Rican residents in 1917, the Insular Cases doctrine cemented the notion of “otherness” that undergirded the decisions on how to govern the 1898 territories. 249
Judge Torruella expresses the concern that John W. Burgess’ views
of political voice as privilege rather than right have become a reality:
What we have in this relationship is not the subordination of Puerto Rico’s political power to that of
the United States, but rather the lack of any political
power by Puerto Rico vis–à–vis the United States.
The United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico
do not have the right to vote for national offices.
Even more importantly, they lack any voting representation in Congress, the body that has plenary
power over Puerto Rico and its citizens, and whose
enactments permeate every facet of Puerto Rican
society. Supreme legislative power therefore lies
solely in an institution that enacts laws without any
effective participation or consent from the U.S. citizens who are obligated to comply with them. 250
What Judge Torruella describes is essentially government
without consent of the governed 251 and total disregard for the Enlightenment principles that led to the creation of the United States

Torruella, supra note 29, at 62–63.
Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 291 (“The ‘other’ is always inferior, less
capable, predestined, of course, to be governed, to be held in tutelage . . . or
‘protected,’ to be brought within the ideological world of the dominating power,
but sufficiently at a distance so as not to confuse the respective communities
they inhabit; in short, to be kept at the same time ‘within and without’ the Constitution.”).
250
Torruella, supra note 29, at 82.
251
Id.
248
249
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in the first place. 252 Furthermore, as Professor Rivera Ramos postulates, the notion of “otherness” facilitated the current colonial
relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. 253 He describes the principle of the inequality of peoples as the grounds for
expanding the American Empire in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean:
The categories [of peoples] were constructed in direct reference to race: the white, Anglo–Saxon race
was the privileged pole in the discourse of power;
the “others,” the non–white and the non–Europeans,
those of mixed races, were to be in the receiving
end of the exercise of that power. Those “others”
were the barbarous, the stagnant, the irrational, the
indolent, the disorderly and the undeserving more
fit to be governed than to govern. Whereas the temperate zones were thought to be more conducive to
hard work . . . and [] capacity for self–government
and economic and scientific progress, the “tropics”
were considered to be breeders of lazy, ignorant,
and inferior populations incapable of self–
government and condemned to be governed from
outside in order to progress and civilization ever to
flourish in their midst. 254
The “barbaric races,” as John W. Burgess would describe
them, 255 were undeserving of self–government and incorporation
into the American polity by the full extension of privileges accompanying American citizenship. 256
See Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 288 (“Just as the American Revolution and the founding of the nation had been permeated by the early rhetoric of
the Enlightenment – with its emphasis on a particular conception of freedom,
reason, and progress – so the new phase of imperial republicanism . . . was to
incorporate the consummate discourse of latter day Enlightenment culture: a true
‘imperial culture . . . whose forward march of power and knowledge, of rationality and control led spatially across the globe while penetrating internally with
new modes of regimentation.”).
253
See id. at 284–85.
254
Id. at 286.
255
Id. at 287.
256
See id. at 285–86.
252
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The combination of these Social Darwinist views and the necessity created by the new challenges that the federal government
faced when the United States suddenly acquired the heavily populated and “exotic” territories demanded the creation of a new colonial policy, but the Constitution was a challenge to effective governance. 257 Drawing from the overtly racist discussion of the day,
including the corollary concepts of “otherness” and Social Darwinism, 258 the Insular Cases regimented American colonial policy into
its legal interpretation, allowing Congress to subordinate the unincorporated territories and deprive them of any constitutional guarantee, except those that Congress allows. 259
IV.

UNITED STATES V. VAELLO-MADERO

A.

The Facts
The Appellee, José Luis Vaello–Madero was born in Puerto
Rico in 1954. 260 Like all others born in Puerto Rico after 1917, he
is a United States citizen as a result of the Jones–Shafroth Act and
later legislation “granting birthright citizenship to Puerto Rico’s
native–born inhabitants.” 261 The Appellee lived in New York from
1985 until 2013. 262 While still residing in New York, the Appellee
“was afflicted with severe health problems” that required him
seeking aid under the SSI program. 263 In 2012, he was eligible to
receive SSI benefits and began receiving such payments to a
checking account in New York. 264
However, in 2013, Appellee moved to Loíza, Puerto Rico, and
did not face any issues with SSI payments connected to his relocation until June 2016. 265 Upon applying for Title II Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, as distinguished from Title
XVI Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the Social Security
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265

See id. at 287–91.
See Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 289–90.
Id. at 298, 300.
United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2020).
Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (2020).
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Administration notified him “that it was discontinuing his SSI benefits retroactively to August 1, 2014 because he was, and had been
since that date, ‘outside of the U.S. for 30 days in a row or
more.’” 266 According to the Code of Federal Regulations, the Social Security Administration does not consider Puerto Rico to be a
part of the United States in “the geographical sense.” 267 Furthermore, the Social Security Administration will not make SSI payments to individuals that are not present in one of the states, the
District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariana Islands 268 for more
than thirty days 269 because the beneficiary must be a resident of the
United States. 270
A year after discontinuing the Appellee’s SSI payments, the
federal government filed a suit against him in federal court for the
District of Puerto Rico, seeking to collect $28,081. 271 The damages
claimed were the amount owed to the Social Security Administration by the Appellee due to the “improper payment of SSI benefits” after he left New York for Puerto Rico. 272
B.

The District Court’s Decision
The Appellee raised an equal protection defense, arguing that
the exclusion from the SSI program of Puerto Rico residents, who
are citizens of the United States, contravened the equal protection
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. 273 Meanwhile, the federal
government argued that Congress could exclude Puerto Rican residents from SSI benefits under its “authority to enact social and
economic regulation.” 274 After realizing that there were “no material facts in contention” and that the resolution of the dispute depended solely on whether exclusion of Puerto Ricans from the SSI
Id. at 15–16.
20 C.F.R. § 416.215 (2020); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (2020).
268
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 16; see also 48 U.S.C. § 1801; see also 20
C.F.R. § 416.215.
269
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 15–16.
270
Id. at 16; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (2020) (“For purposes of this title,
the term ‘aged, blind, or disabled individual’ means an individual who . . . is a
resident of the United States . . . .”).
271
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 16.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 213 (D.P.R. 2019).
266
267
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program violated the Fifth Amendment, both parties filed for
summary judgment. 275
The District Court disagreed with the federal government’s argument that Congress “can disparately classify United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico” because it would be “counter to the
very essence and fundamental guarantees of the Constitution itself.” 276 Relying on United States v. Windsor, the court states that
the “liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any
person the equal protection of the laws.” 277 In Windsor, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the constitutional guarantee of equality “‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treatment of that group.’” 278 At the same time, according to the District
Court, the Territorial Clause of Article IV of the Constitution did
not supply the federal government with the ability to determine
which rights apply in the Territories and in what circumstances,
especially fundamental guarantees like the equal protection of the
laws. 279 Under Boumediene v. Bush, the court says:
“Abstaining from questions involving formal sovereignty and territorial governance is one thing. To
hold the political branches have the power to switch
the Constitution on or off at will is quite another.”
This “would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in
which Congress and the President . . . say what the
law is.” The authority to treat the territory of Puerto
Rico itself unlike the States does not stretch as far
as to permit the abrogation of fundamental constitutional protections to United States citizens as Congress sees fit. 280
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 16.
Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 213.
277
Id. (citing United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)).
278
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (citing Dep’t of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)).
279
Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 213.
280
Id. (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 765 (2008)).
275
276

138

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1

The District Court, under these principles, found that Congress’s legislative authority to enact economic and social legislation was insufficient justification for excluding Puerto Ricans,
United States citizens, from SSI benefits. 281 Judge Gelpí, for the
District of Puerto Rico, stated:
In light of Windsor, the discriminatory statute at bar
fails to pass rational basis constitutional muster.
United States citizens in Puerto Rico are deprived of
receiving SSI benefits based solely on the fact that
they live in a United States territory. Classifying a
group of the Nation’s poor and medically neediest
United States citizens as “second tier” simply because they reside in Puerto Rico is by no means rational. An overwhelming percentage of the United
States citizens residing in Puerto Rico are of Hispanic origin and are regarded as such despite their
birthright United States citizenship. 282
The District Court went on to find that the exclusion of Puerto
Rican residents from SSI was a “deprivation of the liberty of the
person,” guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment. 283 Pursuing governmental efficiency, an essential component of “line drawing”
necessary for Congress to enact social and economic legislation,
“is never a valid reason for disparate treatment of United States
citizen’s fundamental rights.” 284
Furthermore, the arbitrariness of Congress’s decision to exclude Puerto Rican residents from SSI benefits is shown by the
inclusion of the Northern Mariana Islands in the program, and “evidences that Congress, in fact, has recognized the importance of
extending the program to United States citizens in the territo-

Id. at 213.
Id. at 214.
283
Id.
284
Id. at 214–15 (Judge Gelpí highlights that the federal government argued
that both (1) the high cost of including Puerto Rico in the SSI program and (2)
the fact that Puerto Rico does not pay federal income taxes that fund the SSI
program were sufficient grounds to exclude Puerto Rico) (emphasis added).
281
282
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ries.” 285 Importantly, the court found for the Appellee because
equal protection guarantees are fundamental rights “of all United
States citizens” and those rights should apply equally “in the States
as in the Territories, without distinction.” 286 Congress’s attempt to
legislate “a citizenship apartheid based on historical and social
ethnicity within United States soil” contravenes the fundamental
guarantees of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution and
creates “an impermissible second rate citizenship akin to that
premised on race and amounts to Congress switching off the Constitution.” 287 Ultimately, the District Court found that Congress
could use neither its authority to pass social and economic legislation nor the Territorial Clause of Article IV as “blank check[s]” to
“dictate when and where the Constitution applies to its citizens,”
even if these citizens are outside the nation’s borders. 288
C.

On Appeal at the First Circuit
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s
judgment and focused on Supreme Court precedent that the federal
government used to justify its exclusion of Puerto Rican residents
from SSI benefits. 289 Under the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection component, a denial of due process results from discrimination
by the federal government. 290 For the equal protection standard,
the First Circuit utilizes the rational basis test to determine the con-

285
Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 215 n.8; see also United States v.
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 30 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[T]he fact that Congress extended SSI benefits to the residents of the Northern Mariana Islands as part of
the Islands’ covenant to enter the United States undercuts the Appellant’s only
offered explanations for the exclusion. Aside from where they live, the otherwise SSI–qualifying residents of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands
have the legally–relevant characteristics in common, i.e., they are (1) low–
income and low–resourced, (2) elderly, disabled, or blind, and (3) generally
exempted from paying federal income tax.”).
286
Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 215.
287
Id.
288
Id. (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (“The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and
govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply.”)).
289
Id.
290
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 18 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954)).
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stitutionality of the challenged law. 291 Under rational basis review,
“a legislative classification” will be upheld if “the classification
itself is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.” 292
Furthermore, the standard places the burden of proof on the party
challenging the law to defeat “every conceivable basis which
might support it.” 293 Under the United States Code Title 42’s section 1381, the challenged classification are those United States citizens who are otherwise eligible for SSI benefits but for their residence in Puerto Rico. 294 According to the First Circuit, such classification is “clearly irrelevant to the stated purpose of the program,
which is to provide cash assistance to the nation’s financially
needy elderly, disabled, or blind” and must be sustained by “some
legitimate governmental interest [not] specifically stated in the
[law].” 295
i. The First Circuit Indirectly Addresses the Relevance of the
Insular Cases Through Its Treatment of Califano and Harris
To fulfill the rational basis requirements, the federal government argued that exclusion of Puerto Rican residents serves legitimate governmental interests because of “the unique tax status of
Puerto Rico and the costs of extending the program” to its residents. 296 The federal government also proffered Califano v. Gautier Torres, a Supreme Court decision from 1978, as a basis on
which to exclude Puerto Rican residents from SSI. 297 Califano had
reversed a district court judgment holding that denial of SSI payments to “a recipient who acquired them while a resident of Connecticut, but was thereafter denied them by reason of his moving to
Puerto Rico,” contravened his “constitutional right to travel.” 298
According to the First Circuit, the federal government regarded
Califano as valuable precedent because it involved a statutory pro-

291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298

Id.
Id. (citing Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno 413 U.S. 533 (1973)).
Id. (citing FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
Id.
Id. at 18–19.
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 19.
Id.; see generally Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978).
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 19.
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vision establishing government benefits and is thus entitled to “a
strong presumption of constitutionality.” 299
The federal government also relied on Harris v. Rosario, in
which the Supreme Court held that Congress derived sufficient
authority from the Territorial Clause to “treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions.” 300 According to the Supreme Court, three factors enunciated in Califano were enough to fulfill the rational basis test and uphold the exclusion of Puerto Rican residents from SSI: (1) Puerto
Rican residents do not pay federal taxes, (2) the cost of extending
SSI to the Island would be high, and (3) the increased benefits
would “disrupt the Puerto Rican economy.” 301
The First Circuit underscores that, while still valid Supreme
Court precedent, Califano and Harris dealt with the right to travel
and with block grants for the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Program, respectively, not with the “validity of alleged
discriminatory treatment . . . as required by the SSI program under
the prism of equal protection.” 302 As such, neither case was controlling Supreme Court precedent precluding the Appellee’s claim
that his exclusion from SSI contravened equal protection guarantees. 303 At the same time, despite Califano and Harris, the First
Circuit maintains that the federal government must still have a rational justification to make suspect legislative classification, or else
the rational basis test might become a “nullity” and “suspend the
operation of the Equal Protection Clause in the field of social welfare law . . . .” 304 Thus, the First Circuit finds that equal protection
principles survive Califano and Harris, and can be grounds to de-

Id. (citing Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976)).
Id. at 20 (citing Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980)).
301
Id. (citing Califano, 435 U.S. at 5 n.7).
302
Id. at 21.
303
Id. (“Of relevance to Appellant’s contention that Califano and Harris
control this appeal is an axiomatic legal tenet that must be factored into consideration of our ultimate decision: that [t]he precedential effect of a summary [disposition] can extend no further than ‘the precise issues presented and necessarily
decided by those actions.’”).
304
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 21 (citing Baker v. City of Concord, 916
F.2d 744, 749 (1st Cir. 1990)).
299
300
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cide the Appellee’s claim in Vaello-Madero despite valid Supreme
Court precedent. 305
ii. The Federal Government Fails the Rational Basis Test
The First Circuit held that denying SSI benefits to the Appellee, and Puerto Rican residents by extension, does not meet the
standards of the rational basis test. 306 The First Circuit found that
excluding Puerto Rican residents merely for residing in a territory
and not a state bore no “rational relation to a legitimate legislative
goal.” 307 Furthermore, the First Circuit found unpersuasive the
federal government’s contention, stated previously in Califano,
that “the unique tax status of Puerto Rico [by which] its residents
do not contribute to the public treasury” because they do not pay
federal taxes. 308 Similarly, the court disagreed with the federal
government’s contention that the cost of including Puerto Rican
residents in the SSI program was sufficient to establish a rational
basis to exclude them. 309
The First Circuit initially ascertains that not only does Puerto
Rico make “substantial contributions to the federal treasury,” but
“in fact have consistently made them in higher amounts than taxpayers in at least six states, as well as the territory of the Northern
Mariana Islands.” 310 Additionally, the court also highlights that
Puerto Rican residents do make federal income tax payments when
they receive income from sources outside Puerto Rico (when fed305
See id. at 17–23 (distinguishing Califano and Harris and arguing that
equal protection principles survived these cases).
306
Id. at 23.
307
Id.
308
Id. at 24.
309
Id. at 27.
310
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 24 (“From 1998 up until 2006, when Puerto
Rico was hit by its present economic recession, Puerto Rico consistently contributed more than $4 billion annually in federal taxes and impositions into the
national fisc. This is more than taxpayers in several of the states contributed,
including Vermont, Wyoming, South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana, and Nebraska, as well as the Northern Mariana Islands. Even since 2006 to the present,
and notwithstanding monumental economic problems aggravated by catastrophic Hurricane María and serious ongoing earthquakes, Puerto Ricans continue to pay substantial sums into the federal treasury through the IRS:
$3,443,334,000 in 2018; $3,393,432,000 in 2017; $3,479,709,000 in
2016 . . . .”).
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eral employees on the Island make regular payment of income taxes), as well as the full Social Security, Medicare, and Unemployment Compensation taxes that are paid elsewhere in the United
States. 311 As a result, according to the First Circuit, the justification of excluding of Puerto Rican residents from SSI by arguing
that the island’s residents do not contribute to the federal treasury
is “no longer available.” 312 Moreover, the First Circuit is not able
to identify any other instance where the government has used the
total absence of federal income tax payments as justification to
exclude entire classes of people from welfare programs. 313
Next, the First Circuit determined that while Congress has ample power to “create classifications that allocate noncontractual
benefits under a social welfare program [and] protecting the fiscal
integrity of Government programs,” considering cost alone is not
sufficient justification for “differentiating individuals.” 314 In the
case at hand, the First Circuit explained that the deference usually
afforded to “decisions based on fiscal considerations ‘that improve
the protection afforded to the entire benefitted class’” is inapplicable where “an entire segment of the would–be benefitted class is
excluded.” 315 According to the First Circuit, focusing only on the
cost of extending SSI to cover Puerto Rican residents falls outside
Congress’s authority to make decisions to “protect the fiscal integrity” of similar welfare programs and the government itself because “the Fifth Amendment does not permit the arbitrary treatment of individuals who would otherwise qualify for SSI” if not
for their residence in Puerto Rico. 316 Thus, according to the First
Circuit, considering only the cost of including Puerto Rico’s disabled, elderly, and blind in the federally–funded SSI program does
not fulfill the rational basis test. 317
Id. at 25.
Id.
313
Id. at 26 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63 (1982) (“Appellants’ reasoning would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services
according to the past tax . . . contributions of its citizens. The Equal Protection
Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state services.”) (emphasis added)).
314
Id. at 28–29.
315
Id. at 29.
316
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 30.
317
Id.
311
312
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Importantly, the First Circuit disarms the federal government’s
final argument that there is “no ‘equal footing doctrine’” between
the territories that requires the peoples of one territory being treated the same as those of another. 318 The federal government cited
Palmore v. United States for the idea that “Congress may legislate
differently for the territories than for the states, and differently for
one territory than for another.” 319 The First Circuit found this use
of Palmore “inapt” because the case did not opine concretely on
“Congress’s disparate treatment of territorial residents” and focused only on the question on what court could try and convict
Palmore. 320 As a result, the court “decline[s] to read Palmore’s
holding so broadly as to permit Congress to sidestep the Fifth
Amendment when it legislates for a territory.” 321 Hence, the First
Circuit holds, the federal government has no authority supporting
the notion that “the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantees should likewise stand aside in this case.” 322 Thus, the federal
government was not allowed to arbitrarily deny SSI benefits to the
residents of Puerto Rico because of the equal protection doctrine of
the Fifth Amendment. 323
V.
ANALYSIS
The Equal Protection Clause mandates that “all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” 324 The District Court
for the District of Puerto Rico and the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit move squarely in the direction of making the
above statement a reality for the residents of Puerto Rico. 325 The
See id. at 31.
Id.
320
Id.
321
Id.
322
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 31.
323
Id.
324
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 415 (1920)).
325
See, e.g., Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 23 (“Congress may not invidiously
discriminate among such claimants on the basis of a ‘bare congressional desire
to harm a politically unpopular group,’ or on the basis of criteria which bear no
rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal.” (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975))).
318
319
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Vaello-Madero decisions elevate the status of American citizens
residing in Puerto Rico to that of American citizens residing in the
fifty states. 326 Referring to the federal government’s reliance on
Article IV’s Territorial Clause, the District Court emphasized that
“[t]his clause . . . is not carte blanche for Congress to switch on
and off at its convenience the fundamental constitutional rights to
Due Process and Equal Protection enjoyed by a birthright United
States citizen who relocates from a State to Puerto Rico.” 327 Judge
Gelpí continues: “Congress, likewise, cannot demean and brand
said United States citizen while in Puerto Rico with a stigma of
inferior citizenship to that of his brethren nationwide.” 328 The District Court and the First Circuit reaffirm that the principles of due
process and equal protection apply in the territories as “sacrosanct
fundamental constitutional protections afforded to United States
citizens” in the same way they apply in the states of the Union. 329
A.

Vaello-Madero Is Not the End of the Insular Cases
In rejecting the federal government’s contention that the Territorial Clause allows Congress to enact social welfare legislation for
the territories and to determine the eligibility for such programs in
any way, the District Court and the First Circuit have signaled that
the federal judiciary will restrict the omnipotent plenary powers of
Congress. 330 However, Vaello-Madero is not a repudiation of the
Insular Cases; nowhere does it grapple with the political relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. 331 Nonetheless,
326
United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 214 (D.P.R. 2019)
(“Classifying a group of the Nation’s poor and medically neediest United States
citizens as ‘second tier’ simply because they reside in Puerto Rico is by no
means rational.”).
327
Id. at 211.
328
Id.
329
Id. at 213; see also Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 31 (“So, for the reasons
explained throughout this opinion, we hold that the Fifth Amendment forbids the
arbitrary denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico.”).
330
Vaello-Madero, 356 F.3d at 212–13 (stating that the Territorial Clause
does not encompass unlimited power to legislate for the territories).
331
See, e.g., id. at 212 (“Today’s ruling will not delve into the complex constitutional issues of Puerto Rico as a territory of the United States for the past
120 years.”). The First Circuit’s affirmation is based on its interpretation of the
federal government’s claims under Califano and Harris and not directly on the
Insular Cases. See Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 21–22.
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the decisions are a setback for the federal government’s ability to
justify treating American citizens in nonincorporated territories as
second–class citizens. 332 In turn, this likely entails a stricter reading of the Insular Cases, retracting from the federal government’s
ability to legislate for the territories without adhering to fundamental constitutional guarantees. 333 This aligns closer with Justice
Brown’s pronouncements in the Downes opinion than to Justice
White’s development of the incorporation doctrine in the plurality
opinion of the same case. 334 Curiously, however, in expounding
the incorporation doctrine, it was Justice White himself who said:
“[E]ven in cases where there is no direct command of the Constitution which applies, there may nevertheless be restrictions of so
fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed, although not
expressed in so many words in the Constitution.” 335 Unfortunately,
Justice White did not specify which rights he had in mind. 336
As has been demonstrated in the Ninth Circuit, federal courts
are capable of taking advantage of such lack of specificity regarding the application of constitutional guarantees in the territories. 337
Thus, as Professor Herald laments, the judiciary branch is able to
stretch the Insular Cases doctrine to circumvent the application of

Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 214.
See id. at 210–11.
334
Compare Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 283 (“Whatever may be
finally decided by the American people as to the status of these islands and their
inhabitants . . . it does not follow that, in the meantime, awaiting that decision,
the people are in the matter of personal rights unprotected by the provisions of
our Constitution . . . .”), with Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 293 (“And the
determination of what particular provision of the Constitution is applicable,
generally speaking, in all cases, involves an inquiry into the situation of the
territory and its relation to the United States.”) (White, J., concurring).
335
Downes, 182 U.S. 244, 291 (White, J., concurring).
336
Id. at 294–95 (“Undoubtedly, there are general prohibitions in the Constitution in favor of the liberty and property of the citizen . . . which are an absolute
denial of all authority under any circumstances or conditions to do particular
acts.”) (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
337
See, e.g., Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (1990) (Employing
the “impractical and anomalous” standard to circumvent equal protection guarantees in the Northern Mariana Islands to “preserve and protect” the islands’
culture and land.).
332
333
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“fundamental” constitutional guarantees. 338 Concurring in
Rassmussen v. United States, part of the Insular Cases, Justice
Harlan, the elder, criticized such an approach by the Supreme
Court and took a position analogous to the one in Vaello-Madero:
The proposition that a people subject to the full authority of the United States for purposes of government, may, under any circumstances, or for any period of time, long or short, be governed, as Congress pleases to ordain, without regard to the Constitution, is, in my judgment, inconsistent with the
whole theory of our institutions.
If the Constitution does not become the supreme
law in a Territory acquired by treaty, and whose inhabitants are under the dominion of the United
States, until Congress . . . shall have expressed its
will to that effect, it would necessarily follow
that . . . Congress, under the theory of “incorporation” . . . could forever withhold from the inhabitants of such Territory the benefit of all the guaranties of life, liberty, and property as set forth in the
Constitution. I cannot assent to any such doctrine. I
cannot agree that the supremacy of the Constitution
depends upon the will of Congress. 339
The elder Justice Harlan’s statement highlights the danger of
the incorporation doctrine that has taken hold of the federal judiciary when dealing with the territories and has allowed the government more freedom when legislating for unincorporated territories. 340
Herald, supra note 45, at 712, 768; see also Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1463
(concluding that congressionally–enacted provisions of a territorial constitution
are not subject to challenge under equal protection guarantees).
339
Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 530 (1905) (Harlan, J., concurring).
340
See Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 254 (“‘There is a wide difference,’
[Justice Brown] argued, ‘between the full and paramount power of Congress in
legislating for a territory in the condition of Porto Rico and its power with respect to the States . . . .’” (citing Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 155
(1901))).
338
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Despite his grandfather’s position in Rassmussen, Justice Harlan created the “impractical and anomalous” standard, derived
from the Insular Cases, 341 and used in Wabol to justify circumventing equal protection guarantees. 342 It is precisely against this
trend of doctrinal overexpansion that Vaello-Madero militates,
even though neither the District Court nor the First Circuit relied
directly on the Insular Cases. 343 Furthermore, it is sadly ironic that
federal courts in the 21st century should be struggling with precedent to revert the judiciary branch to Justice Brown’s opinion in
Downes, when a plurality agreed that fundamental constitutional
guarantees should apply to the territories. 344 According to the reasonings in Vaello-Madero, the Constitution and the Insular Cases
do not give Congress the ability to cherry–pick which fundamental
protections apply to the territories. 345 Hence, like in Downes and
Flores de Otero, 346 Vaello-Madero affirms that the Constitution’s
equal protection and due process guarantees constrain the federal
government’s use of its broad territorial powers conferred to it by
the Territorial Clause. 347
Nonetheless, Vaello-Madero is not by any means a death blow
to the Insular Cases, but merely reaffirms that fundamental constitutional guarantees should apply in unincorporated territories. 348
As a result, Vaello-Madero is only a return to the beginning of the
Insular Cases doctrine. 349
Merriam, supra note 230, at 181.
Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462.
343
See generally United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 210–
11 (D.P.R. 2019) (denying that the Territorial Clause is a blank check for Congress to pick and choose which constitutional provisions apply in the territories
in any given time, which is opposed to the Insular Cases and their progeny).
344
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 268 (1901) (citing Mormon Church v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 10 (1890)).
345
See, e.g., Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 213.
346
Examining Bd. of Eng’rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976);
see Downes, 182 U.S. at 282–83.
347
See United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2020);
see also Vaello Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 210–11.
348
Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 213 (“The authority to treat the territory of Puerto Rico itself unlike the States does not stretch as far as to permit the
abrogation of fundamental constitutional protections to United States citizens as
Congress sees fit.”).
349
Downes, 182 U.S. at 282–83.
341
342
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i. Vaello-Madero Promotes the Development of Democratic
Relationships between the United States and the People of the
Unincorporated Territories
Vaello-Madero is plainly contrasted with the Ninth Circuit’s
dangerous extension of the Insular Cases doctrine in Wabol in
holding that the “impractical and anomalous standard” allowed the
federal government to circumvent equal protection guarantees in
the Northern Mariana Islands. 350 One is well served by remembering Judge Pool’s distinction between the fundamental rights that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to the states versus the fundamental rights incorporated into
the Territory Clause to be applied in the unincorporated territories. 351 The Ninth Circuit’s understanding of Territorial Clause
authority and the Insular Cases is much more expansive than the
First Circuit’s. 352
Vaello-Madero promotes what future Justice Felix Frankfurter
termed in 1914 “inventive statesmanship” because it reinterprets
authority under the Territorial Clause and the Insular Cases to encourage a more democratic relationship between the United States
and its territories. 353 According to Hernández Colón, inventive
Compare Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 213 (“[T]he broad power
granted under the Territorial Clause does not allow Congress to eradicate the
sacrosanct fundamental constitutional protections afforded to United States
citizens residing in the States and Puerto Rico.”) (emphasis added), and VaelloMadero, 956 F.3d at 23 (applying the rational basis test because equal protection
guarantees attach to United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico), with Wabol
v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying the “impractical
and anomalous” standard to circumvent equal protection guarantees).
351
Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460.
352
See id. (“This court rejected the broad proposition that those guarantees
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment for application to the states must
also be incorporated into the territory clause for application to the Commonwealth. What is fundamental for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation is that which ‘is necessary to an Anglo–American regime of ordered liberty.’ In contrast, ‘fundamental’ within the territory clause are “‘those . . . limitations in favor of personal rights’ which are ‘the basis of all free government.’”)
(citations omitted).
353
See Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 213 (“The powers granted under
the Constitution are not infinite. ‘The power the Constitution grants it also restrains. And though Congress has great authority to design laws to fit its own
conception of sound national policy, it cannot deny the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’”) (citing United States v. Wind350
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statesmanship is required “to establish truly democratic arrangements and allocations of powers protected by the U.S. Constitution, based on the principle of consent by the governed.” 354 VaelloMadero’s defense of fundamental constitutional guarantees pursues inventive statesmanship by respecting Puerto Rico’s right to
self–determination and the principle of government by consent, as
recognized in the compact created under Public Law 600 in
1950. 355 As one commentator has noted, “[O]nce a society, such as
[Puerto Rico], freely chooses to become a “part” of the United
States, and its inhabitants freely choose to become citizens of the
United States, then the application of the Constitution should not
be subject to negotiation.” 356
Vaello-Madero’s refusal to compromise in the application of
equal protection guarantees in the territories, as the federal government urged, pursues the principles of individual liberty and true
government by consent. 357 Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg asserted a similar principle in their dissent in Schuette v. Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action:

sor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013)); see also Hernández Colón, supra note 109, at
603 (“[Cases like Flores de Otero] . . . supplied Congress with creative judicial
platforms within the Territorial Clause on which to structure democratic relationships with citizens of the United States residing in nonstate areas. Respect
for the integrity of these judicial platforms ensures that these relationships—
conceived in liberty and by the consent of the governed—protect the rights of
Puerto Ricans as American citizens.”).
354
See Hernández Colón, supra note 109, at 589, 593.
355
Id. at 593; see also Public Law 600 ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319, 319 (1950).
356
Herald, supra note 45, at 756 (citing James A. Branch, Jr., The Constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands: Does a Different Cultural Setting Justify
Different Constitutional Standards?, 9 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 35, 38–39
(1980)).
357
Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 213 (“‘The liberty protected by the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition
against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.”‘); see also
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672 (2015) (“The Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set
forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by
equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive,
yet, in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of
the other.”).
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We are fortunate to live in a democratic society. But
without checks, democratically approved legislation
can oppress minority groups. For that reason, our
constitution places limits on what a majority of the
people may do. Although [the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws] is traditionally understood to
prohibit intentional discrimination under existing
laws, equal protection does not end there. Another
fundamental strand of our equal protection jurisprudence focuses on process, securing to all citizens
the right to participate meaningfully and equally in
self–government. That right is the bedrock of our
democracy, for it preserves all other rights. 358
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court must address the validity of
the Insular Cases in the 21st century if it wants to pursue the ideals
of Vaello-Madero and elevate American citizens in the territories
to the status of American citizens in the states. 359 If not, federal
courts are likely to continue pursuing an early 20th century agenda
of distinguishing between citizens within the nation’s borders and
those without. 360 However, it is difficult to see how the Supreme
Court could sharply redefine the Insular Cases doctrine precisely
because of the amorphous nature that has facilitated its progressive
expansion to the point where some federal courts are prepared to
hold that the federal government is not always bound by fundamental guarantees. 361

Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 337
(2014) (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, J.J., dissenting).
359
See Hernández Colón, supra note 109, at 604.
360
Id. at 593.
361
See generally Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992), for an
example of how the Insular Cases doctrine and its progeny, like the “impractical
and anomalous” standard, have been used to justify not applying the most basic
constitutional protections in the territories; see generally Merriam, supra note
230, for an explanation of the vague and manipulable nature of the legal principles derived from the Insular Cases.
358
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B.
It Is Unreasonable to Expect that the Supreme Court Will
Use Vaello-Madero to Overrule the Insular Cases
The major shortcoming of Vaello-Madero is that neither of the
decisions refers explicitly to the Insular Cases when rejecting the
federal government’s contentions. 362 Instead, Vaello-Madero approaches the Insular Cases implicitly by how it handles the federal
government’s reliance on Califano and Harris. 363 Additionally, the
First Circuit does not speak to the validity of Califano and Harris;
instead, it opts to say that those cases are not controlling for Vaello-Madero 364 despite knowing that Califano and Harris rely on the
Insular Cases doctrine for their reasoning. 365 For instance, in footnote four of Califano, the Supreme Court appeared to accept the
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico’s acknowledgment
that “Congress has the power to treat Puerto Rico differently, and
that every federal program does not have to be extended to it.” 366
In the same note, the Supreme Court remarked that “Puerto Rico
has a relationship to the United States ‘that has no parallel in our
history,’” and cited the Insular Cases for this proposition. 367 As a
result, at the Supreme Court, Vaello-Madero has a reduced potential to redefine the Insular Cases, particularly because the doctrine
from these cases is not a foundational element of the District
Court’s or the First Circuit’s reasoning. This problem is further
compounded by the Supreme Court’s reticence in recent cases to

362
See Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 212 (“Today’s ruling will not
delve into the complex constitutional issues of Puerto Rico as a territory of the
United States for the past 120 years.”).
363
United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2020) (highlighting that the ratio decidendi of Califano and Harris might be outdated).
364
Id. at 21 (“We are of the view that Califano was not decided on equal
protection grounds, and that Harris did not involve a challenge to SSI direct aid
to persons, and thus, neither case forecloses Appellee’s present contention that
his wholesale exclusion from SSI violates the equal protection guarantee. We do
not view Califano and Harris as a carte blanche for all federal direct assistance
programs to discriminate against Puerto Rico residents.”).
365
See Brief for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, United States v. Vaello-Madero, No. 20–303 (Sup. Ct.
Nov. 9, 2020).
366
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 3 n.4 (1978).
367
Id.
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address the validity of the Insular Cases, even when encouraged to
do so by multiple parties and amici. 368
In Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico
v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, the Insular Cases were explicitly
brought to the Supreme Court’s attention after parties defending
the Board’s existence argued that the Appointments Clause of Article II did not apply to Puerto Rico because of the Insular Cases
doctrine. 369 Jessica Méndez–Colberg, counsel for one of the parties
in Aurelius, argued that “Equal [J]ustice [U]nder [L]aw,” the
words at the entrance to the Court’s building, represented a principle “stretch[ed] . . . into its breaking point” under the Insular Cases. 370 “The court–made doctrine of territorial incorporation,” she
continued, “means that when my client, and even myself, return to
Puerto Rico, we will have a lesser set of constitutional rights than
what we have standing here today.” 371 Ms. Méndez–Colberg raised
the issue of the Insular Cases doctrine at multiple points during her
oral argument and despite arguing that the opposing party relied on
the incorporation doctrine in defense of the Board’s existence, 372
the Justices appeared to ignore her pleas. 373 Notwithstanding the
impassioned criticism of the Insular Cases at oral argument, the
Supreme Court in Aurelius declined to address their validity in its
reasoning for upholding the appointment of Board members. 374
Vaello-Madero did not make the Insular Cases doctrine a central aspect of its rationales, perhaps because the courts wished to
avoid addressing its complexity and to reserve judgment for the
Supreme Court. 375 However, the Supreme Court has yet to address
See Cepeda Derieux & Weare, supra note 40, at 286.
Id. at 285.
370
Transcript of Oral Argument at 81, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.
v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020) (No. 18–1334) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]; see also Cepeda Derieux & Weare, supra note 40, at
285.
371
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 370, at 81.
372
Id. at 85–87.
373
See id.
374
Cepeda Derieux & Weare, supra note 40, at 286.
375
United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2020) (“The
Supreme Court has not been equivocal in its dictates on this subject, stating that
the decisions of that Court ‘remain binding precedent until [the Court] see[s] fit
to reconsider them . . . .’”) (citing Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252–53
(1998)).
368
369
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the Insular Cases, even in situations where it is clearly asked to do
so. 376 This suggests that it is unreasonable to expect that the Court
will do the same if it decides to hear the federal government’s appeal. Hence, the Insular Cases, the incorporation doctrine they
spawned, and cases relying on such doctrine, like Wabol, remain
viable for other courts and the Supreme Court. 377 While this remains the case, any constitutional rights that Puerto Rican residents
currently enjoy are subject to further manipulation by the federal
government and the judiciary. 378
VI.
CONCLUSION
Vaello-Madero should not be viewed as the federal judiciary’s
repudiation of the Insular Cases. Firstly, it only encompasses one
case while the Insular Cases doctrine was built throughout decades
and in at least six cases. 379 It is improbable that, in one fell swoop,
the Supreme Court will discredit such an enormous amount of
precedent because of one case. If the Insular Cases will eventually
cease to be good law, they will likely take decades to dismantle,
even if the Supreme Court ideologically agrees with the premise of
treating American citizens of the unincorporated territories in the
same way as citizens of the States. 380

See Cepeda Derieux & Weare, supra note 40, at 286.
See id. (“Nonetheless, the Court’s clear mistrust of the Insular Cases,
even as it declined to overrule them, continues a trend wherein the Court says
one thing but then permits lower courts to do another. Since at least the 1950s,
the Court has expressed skepticism of its territorial incorporation doctrine and
has said courts should not extend it further. And yet, because they remain on the
books, lower courts continue to rely on the Insular Cases to deprive residents of
U.S. territories of rights and constitutional safeguards they almost surely enjoy.”).
378
See Herald, supra note 45, at 713.
379
Doug Mack, The Strange Case of Puerto Rico, SLATE (Oct. 9, 2017),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/10/the-insular-cases-the-racistsupreme-court-decisions-that-cemented-puerto-ricos-second-class-status.html.
380
See Neil Weare, Why the Insular Cases Must Become the Next Plessy,
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 28, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/whythe-insular-cases-must-become-the-next-plessy/ (“It is long–past time that the
Insular Cases be placed in the dustbin of history . . . .But to get there, we must
rally the same kind of energy and resources that led to the Supreme Court’s
376
377
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Secondly, Vaello-Madero does not altogether break from the
Insular Cases doctrine. The Insular Cases stand for the proposition
that Congress holds omnipotent plenary powers that allow the federal government “to rule over the islands without their consent or
their democratic participation.” 381 The incorporation doctrine, derived from Justice White’s concurrence in Downes, holds that the
applicability of fundamental constitutional restrictions on the government’s authority to legislate for the territories depends on
whether the territory in question is incorporated (i.e., set on a path
for statehood) or unincorporated. 382 Vaello-Madero does not fight
against the tenets of the Insular Cases, but it objects the subsequent expansion of their doctrine and seeks to reaffirm the original
pronouncement by Justice Brown that “Congress, in legislating for
the territories would be subject to those fundamental limitations in
favor of personal rights which are formulated in the Constitution
and its amendments; but these limitations would exist rather by
inference and the general spirit of the Constitution . . . .” 383
Judge Gelpí, for the District of Puerto Rico, echoed this principle in the District Court’s opinion: “It is the Government’s role to
protect the fundamental rights of all United States citizens. Fundamental rights are the same in the States as in the Territories,
without distinction.” 384 Vaello-Madero does not aim to redefine the
omnipotent plenary powers Congress possesses to legislate for the
territories, as is evidenced by the total lack of any reference to the
Insular Cases in the opinions of the District Court and the First
Circuit. 385 Instead, Vaello-Madero only aims to ensure that American citizens in the unincorporated territories are treated equally, in
recognition of the Supreme Court’s original intention in
Downes. 386
historic decision in Brown. As history shows, change does not just happen on its
own.”).
381
Torruella, supra note 29, at 73.
382
See Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 247–48.
383
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 268 (1901) (emphasis added).
384
United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 213 (D.P.R. 2019)
(emphasis added).
385
Id. at 212 (“Congress indeed possesses a wide latitude of powers to effectively govern its territories.”).
386
Id. at 210–11.
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As such, Vaello-Madero militates against the concept of “otherness” inherent in much of the Insular Cases doctrine, whereby
notions of racial superiority, Manifest Destiny, and Social Darwinism were constituted into the American “ideology of expansion.” 387 According to Professor Rivera Ramos, the idea that the
peoples of the territories acquired in 1898 “were not fit to become
full–fledged members of the American polity” and their incapacity
for self–government are ingrained in the Insular Cases. 388 VaelloMadero rejects these ideas and considers the American residents of
Puerto Rico equal to those of the states. 389 Paradoxically, VaelloMadero promises to modernize the Insular Cases doctrine by returning to the original pronouncements of the Insular Cases themselves. 390 The modernizing intent of Vaello-Madero is evident in
the First Circuit’s treatment of Califano and Harris, where the
court recognizes that the jurisprudential impetus in the aftermath of
Boumediene and Windsor requires a renewed analysis of the applicability of the arguments raised in the former cases justifying
the unequal application of the laws to the unincorporated territories. 391
Nonetheless, it is still the federal government’s position that
Congress possesses constitutional authority to single–out the
American citizens residing in Puerto Rico, subject only to the perSee Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 288–89.
Id. at 290.
389
Vaello Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 211 (“To hold otherwise would run
afoul of the sacrosanct principle embodied in the Declaration of Independence
that ‘All Men are Created Equal.’”).
390
Compare Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 211 (“[The Territorial
Clause], however, is not carte blanche for Congress to switch on and off at its
convenience the fundamental constitutional rights to Due Process and Equal
Protection . . . .”), with Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282–83 (1901)
(“[T]here may be a distinction between certain natural rights, enforced in the
constitution by prohibitions against interference with them, and what may be
termed artificial . . . rights, which are peculiar to our own system of jurisprudence. Of the former class are the rights . . . to personal liberty and individual
property . . . to due process of law and to an equal protection of the laws . . . .”).
391
United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2020) (“Although we, of course, cannot and do not quibble with such forceful and binding
mandates, we would be remiss in complying with our own duty were we to
blindly accept the applicability of Califano and Harris without engaging in a
scrupulous inquiry into their relevance, application, and precedential value.”).
387
388
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missive rational basis standard of review. 392 According to the federal government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, the Equal Protection Clause regards “‘persons and classes of persons’ rather than
places, and that the government thus remains free to establish ‘one
system for one portion of its territory and another system for another portion.’” 393 Moreover, the federal government maintains
that equal protection principles do not mandate equal legal treatment of the territories because these principles “‘relate[] to equality between persons, as such, rather than between areas.’” 394 Perhaps the most consequential portion of the federal government’s
argument is its refusal to recognize that equal protection of the
laws does not apply uniformly everywhere that the United States is
sovereign. 395 Their petition proceeds: “Some provisions of the
Constitution do require geographic uniformity . . . but the Equal
Protection Clause simply is not among them.” 396 The government’s adherence to Califano and Harris and to principles of stare
decisis in its arguments reflects its intention to preserve the expanded role of the Insular Cases doctrine, despite the First Circuit’s suggestions that these cases may be disconnected from the
reality of the times. 397
Now that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to hear the
federal government’s appeal of the First Circuit’s decision, 398
Vaello-Madero represents another opportunity for the Supreme
Court to address the folly that is the Insular Cases doctrine in light
of the progress achieved regarding racial attitudes and the ideals of
the politico–socio–economic development of nations since the beginning of the 20th century. While the Insular Cases and their
progeny continue to be accepted, “basic principles of federalism,
government by consent, equal protection of the laws, and the guarantees of a republican form of government” are subjugated to coBrief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 10.
Id. (citing Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30–31 (1880)).
394
Id. (first citing Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914); then
citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961)).
395
Id. at 10–11
396
Id. (citations omitted).
397
See id. at 12–20.
398
Supreme Court to Weigh Puerto Rico Access to U.S. Aid, AP NEWS (Mar.
1, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/supreme-court-puerto-rico-ssi-benefits-b0b
96a610a1b9f9e68f2283029c2aade.
392
393
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lonial prerogatives, expediency and convenience, and to the presumed plenary powers of Congress in the territorial context. 399 As
others have observed, the Insular Cases and the federal government’s ability to enforce disparate treatment of citizens are “obsolete vestige[s] of a racist, imperialist era of our Country which
serves no purpose other than to differentiate between continental
and non–continental American citizens.” 400 If this “dark cloud” 401
of jurisprudence remains on the books, the courts and the federal
government will continue to use the doctrine to deprive American
citizens of their constitutional rights.

Terrasa, supra note 176, at 92.
Id.; see, e.g., Torruella, supra note 29, at 94 (“The Constitution does not
authorize the United States to hold territory or its citizens in such a condition;
the Insular Cases . . . validated this colonial status in direct contravention of the
words and values of the Constitution. These cases were wrongly decided ab
initio.”).
401
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 370, at 82.
399
400

